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The Hughes Court and
Constitutional Consultation
Barry Cushman*

Our conventional image of the Supreme
Court under Charles Evans Hughes calls to mind
the riddle of the Sphinx: What creature walks
on four feet in the morning, on two at noon,
and on three in the evening? The answer with
which Oedipus rescued the city ofThebes from
a reign of terror was, ofcourse, "Man": he crawls
on all fours in infancy, stands erect on two legs
in adulthood, and leans on a staff in old age.
The established story of the Hughes Court inverts the chronology somewhat, but the characters are the same. In the mid- 1930s, the crotchety Nine Old Men impetuously flouted the
popular will, eviscerating the New Deal. Chastened by the disciplining hand of a stem presidential father figure in 1937, a repentant Court
was "reborn," then blossomed into beautiful
but uncertain youth under Harlan Fiske Stone
and Fred Vinson, and grew into mature adulthood under Earl Warren.
The story has its charm, and a certain simple
elegance. It has for many years captured the

imagination of a great many extremely able and

distinguished scholars. In my own impetuous
youth I have come to conclusions that differ
from theirs. But I will not belabor all ofmy reasons for reaching those conclusions here, for it
is not my immediate objective to convert you

to my view of the matter. I ask only that you
suspend disbelief. Forget for a moment, if you
will, that the Justices invalidated New Deal initiatives because they thought them unwise

social policy; forget that they later upheld federal regulations only because the Court-pack-

ing plan put the fear of God into them; forget
that they continued to do so only because they

had seen the light. Forget that the Court's role
under Hughes was entirely reactive: first obstructing, then surrendering to, the political
branches. This will, of course, be disorienting.
But ifall of this forgetting has not already rendered you unconscious, it may enable us to
see the Hughes Court and its role in the New
Deal saga in a new light.
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CHARLES EVANS HUGHES
Consider, for example, the Frazier-Lenike
Farm Debt Relief Act of 1934. The Act provided
extraordinary relief to financially distressed
farmers, allowing them to stay foreclosure proceedings for five years by paying a reasonable
rental on the mortgaged land. At any time during this period the debtor could take title to the
land free and clear of any mortgage simply by
paying its appraised value- even if that value
was substantially less than the amount of the
mortgage debt.
The Act "inspired a stoma of controversy
lover] its validity"" Commentary in the law journals characterized the Act as "hastily drafted
and hurriedly passed" "by a harried Congress,'2 rushing it "through as last minute emergency legislation."' It was criticized as "one of
the worst recent examples, of draftsnianship in
Federal legislation."" "The failure of its ultimate passage even was feared at times," noted
one observer." It was enacted "[d]espite., the
doubts of many members of Congress,"" and
"the fears of its proponents were not allayed
when the President retained the bill for ten days
before signing it" "with apparent hesitation
and misgiving."" At the signing ceremony
Roosevelt presciently remarked, "The bill is in
some respects loosely worded and will require
amendment at the next session of'Congress.'"
The Act's constitutionality was challenged
before the Court in the Spring of 1935 in the
case of Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford` The Justices of the Supreme Court
were unanimously of the opinion that the Act
transgressed limits imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. ChiefJustice Hughes assigned the opinion to Justice
Louis D. Brandeis, who had great sympathy for
the plight of distressed small farmers and for
the objectives of the Act." Brandeis did not
squander the opportunity presented by the assignment, Ile offered a thirty-page examination
of the history of legislative attempts to provide
relief for distressed mortgagors, in which he
painstakingly identified the ways in which the
Frazier-Lemke Act enlarged these protections
beyond anything previously sanctioned by the
Court. The Justice did not confine himself to
identifying one or two deficiencies of the Act
and leave Congress guessing whether other
features of the Act would require revision in
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order to pass constitutional muster. Instead, he
listed five specific substantive rights of the
creditor that the Act infringed.'" As one comment in the Cornell Law Review noted, the
Court "definitely showed that it appreciated the
situation which led to this drastic measure. .. It
indicated that similar legislation might be upheld if it were found to preserve substantially

the rights of mortgagees."

9

The Radford case was handed down on
"Black Monday" -May 27, 1935, That same
day the Court unanimously drew the curtain on

the brief career of the National Industrial Recovery Act in the famous "sick chicken" case,
Schechter Poultrv. UnitedStates. Immediately
following delivery of the decisions, Brandeis
pulled Roosevelt lieutenant Ben Cohen aside
and told him "The President has been living in
a fool's paradise. . . . I should not be surprised
if eveiything would have to be redrafted."2 0
Brandeis' message was clear. The Court, despite its unanimity, was not saying that the fed-

eral government was powerless to address the
economic crisis I-lad this been the import of
the decisions, there would have been little

sense in redrafting anything. Brandeis' point
was instead that the crisis would have to be
addressed with measures consistent with the

Constitution. And Brandeis' opinion in
Radford, with its meticulous discussion of the
Act's constitutional infirmities, provided illuminating advice on how the statute ought to be
redrafted.
And redrafted it was." Within ten days of

theRadforddecisionSenator Frazier had introduced a revised bill, and by the first of July the
Senate Judiciary Committee had issued a unanimous favorable report with amendments."
"Their task was simplified," noted one observer,
"by the opinion pointing out the constitutional

defects of the former Act- .." The result, as
another put it, was a "more carefully drawn"
statute that sought "to cure the flagrant defects summarized by the Court."

When the bill reached the floors of the
House and Senate, several legislators asked

whether the revised bill had rectified the constitutional deficiencies of the first Act, and its

many proponents uniformly professed confidence that it had,-" Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Ashurst was one among
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tion in 1936 and/or the Court-packing plan. In
those cases, it is contended, the Court capitulated to the New Deal in order to defuse the
Court-packing threat. Could it not be contended
with equal force that the Court's decision to

uphold the second Frazier-Lemke Act was similarly motivated?
I don't think so. For even if we assume that
the conventional explanation of the more famous decisions of the spring of 1937 is correct,
the Wright case stands on a different footing.
For all of the other cases to which I have alluded were decided by votes of 5 to 4. Notwithstanding the pressures brought to bear by
the election and by the Court-packing plan- the
Four Horsemen continued to cast votes against

major initiatives for social reform in the most
celebrated cases of the day. The vote in the
Wright case, by contrast, was unanimous.

Sutherland, Butler, Van Devanter, and.
McReynolds were all with the majority. Given

their voting records before, during, and after
the Court-packing crisis, it seems unlikely in
the extreme that they voted to uphold the second Frazier-Lemke Act for any reason other
than that they thought it was constitutional. A
much more persuasive assessment was offered
by a contemporary commentator in the Columbia Law Review, who remarked, "this is a dramatic illustration of the manner in which by careful draftsmanship Congress can overcome constitutional objections when they are explicitly
stated, and thus in a substantial measure attain

the objectives sought by previously invalidated
legislation." 2
A second national regulatory initiative
struck down by the Court in 1935 was section
9(c) of the NationalI ndustrial Recovery Act."
In an effort to stabilize petroleum prices in the
face of a frenzy of wildcat drilling in the East
Texas oil fields, Congress authorized the President to prohibit interstate transportation ofwhat

was called "contraband" or "hot" oil-that is,
oil produced in excess of the amountpermitted
by the law of the state of production. The President had done so by executive order, and had
in turn delegated authority to promulgate appropriate rules and regulations to the Secretary
of the Interior. The President had by further
executive order approved a Code of Fair Com-

petition for the Petroleum Industry. Two petrolearn companies sought to restrain enforcement
of various provisions of the oil regulation progran.4

The litigation of the Hot Oil Cases was
something of a fiasco. Unbeknownst to both
the oil companies and the government lawyers,
a provision of the Petroleum Code at issue had
been inadvertently repealed by a subsequent
executive order before the suits had been initiated- The Attorney General's office had been
unknowingly defending the constitutionality
of a provision that was not even law. Secretary
of the Interior Harold Ickes wrote in his diary
that it made him sick when he thought of the
way the Justice Department's representative had
handled the case before the Supreme Court.
Yet notwithstanding a poor performance by the
attorneys for the government, the Chief Justice still managed to make a little lemonade.
In an opinion written by Hughes, the Court
by a vote of 8 to 1held that section 9(c) constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislafive authority to the executive, '[IJn every case
in which the question has been raised," Hughes
observed, "the Court has recognized that there
are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authonty to transcend. We think that
section 9(c) goes beyond those limits." 7
Hughes patiently reviewed the development of
the Court's delegation jurisprudence from the
years of the early republic to the 1930s, showing how each delegation previously sustained
had satisfied criteria that were unmet in the instant case.t "As to transportation of oil production in excess of state permission," he maintained, "the Congress has declared no policy,
has established no standard, has laid down no
rule." 9 "Section 9(c) does not state whether,
or in what circumstances or under what conditions, the President is to prohibit the transportation. . . It establishes no criterion to govern
the President's course... So far as this section
is concerned, it gives to the President an unlimited authority.,4."
But as Hughes' opinion made clear, this
problem was not irremediable. For as the cases
showed, "Congress. . . may establish primary
standards, devolving upon others the duty to
carry out the declared legislative policy, that is,
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before they get the correct language, before

they get things straightened out according to
correct constitutional methods."" Harold Ickes
surely took encouragement from a conversation he had with Justice Roberts at a dinner
party three days after the Court announced its
decision. Ickes recorded in his diary that Roberts "assured me that be is entirely sympathetic
with what we are trying to do in the oil matter
and that he hoped we would pass a statute that
would enable us to carry out our policy.""
Eleven days after the Court announced its
decision in the Hot Oil Cases, Senator Tom
Connally ofTexas introduced legislation to rectify the problems identified in the Chief Justice's
opinion." Connally, who affirmed his belief
that the Hot Oil Cases had been correctly decided," assured his colleagues that his bill "was
drawn in collaboration with the legal authorities of the Department of the Interior and has
been carefully scrutinized by the oil production board and theirlegal staff."They alljoined
the members of the Senate Committee on
Mines and Mining in believing "that the present
measure obviates the objections which were
urged to the act before the Supreme Court."
The new bill's solution to the delegation problem was arrestingly simple. Rather than delegating authority to prohibit interstate shipment
of hot oil to the President, Congress itself prohibited such shipment by statute." "While the
Supreme Court did not in so many words hold
that the Congress had authority to prohibit"
such shipments, Connally maintained, "there
is every suggestion in the opinion that in the
original case if Congress itself had prohibited
the interstate shipment of this oil itwould have
been better. . .. "61 The bill passed both houses
of Congress without a record vote within six
weeks of the Court's decision. 2
Observers were confident that the Connally
bill would pass muster before the Court. "[I]t
would seem," wrote one, "that Congress has
effectively met the objections expressed by the
Court to the former Act." "[C]orrective legislation." wrote another, "has already been accomplished by the Connally Bill... ."I "[T]he
immediate damage caused by the decision in
the [Hot Oil] case," remarked a third, "is repaired." 5 These assessments were vindicated
in due course. Attacks on the constitutionality

of the Act were uniformly rebuffed in the lower

federal courts. " When an indictment for violation of the Act finally came before the Supreme
Court in 1939, long after the Court-packing plan
had been decisively repudiated, the defendants
did not even challenge the Act's constitutionality. And the unanimous opinion sustaining
the indictment was joined even by the two remaining Horsemen, Justices Pierce Butler and
James C. McReynolds.
Just as overproduction had created tnroil
in the petroleum industry, cutthroat competition in the bituminous coal industry exerted disastrous downward pressures on prices, wages.
and working conditions. In an attempt to impose order on this chaotic situation, Congress
enacted the Guffey Coal Act of 1935. One part
of the Act regulated the price at which coal
moved in interstate commerce." Another part
provided for regulation of wages, hours and
labor relations at the mines. Members of both
houses were plagued by doubts about the constitutionality of the labor provisions, and the
Roosevelt administration had to resort to extraordinary measures to secure a favorable committee report. The bill passed both houses by

unusually slim margins; and the sentiments of
many were summed up by Senator Millard

Tydings' ominous forecast of the Act's future:
"Like an autumn flower it will be blown away
by the first winter blast of the Court."'
The Court did hold the labor provisions
unconstitutional in Carterv Carter Coal Co.7
in 1936. The majority opinion did not, however.
rule on the validity of the price regulation provisions, Instead, the majority found that those

sections were inseparable from the offending
labor provisions. Accordingly, the entire stat-

ute had to fall." Hughes wrote separately,
agreeing that the labor provisions were invalid,
but contending that the price provisions were
valid, and were severable from the labor provi-

sions." Benjamin N. Cardozo, joined by
Brandeis and Stone, agreed in dissent that the
price regulation provisions were valid and severable." Moreover, Cardozo noted sugges-

tively, "Stabilizing prices would go a long way
toward stabilizing labor relations by giving the
producers capacity to pay a living wage."" If
Congress could enact a law regulating the minimum price at which coal moved in interstate
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limited a pension act for railroad employees
might be. . ,still under this decision Congress
would not be at liberty to enact such a measure'"' "The gravest aspect of the decision,"
Hughes remarked gravely, "is that it does not
rest simply upon a condemnation of particular
features of the Railroad Retirement Act, but
denies to Congress the power to pass any compulsory pension act for railroad employees.""
This lament was echoed by Cassandras in
the law reviews,' but it proved to be unwarranted. In the April issue of the St. Louis Law
Review, Ralph Fuchs played the contrarian.
"The decision of the Court does not in reality
exclude the power of Congress," he maintained.
"No reason appears why Congress could not
levy a payroll tax upon the carriers and provide
also for the payment of pensions to retired employees out ofthe Treasury."" In other words,
what Congress could not accomplish through
its Commerce Power it might nevertheless be
able to achieve through its powers to tax and
spend. "To guard against an adverse decision
upon a pension law enacted under the taxing
power," Fuchs cautioned, "it might be wise to
separate the taxing measure and the law authorizing the payment of the pensions."" Fuchs'
theory was that the tax, considered separately
from the pension payments, would be upheld
as a legitimate revenue measure. And the appropriations to pay the pensions, separately
considered, would similarly survive constitutional challenge-though for different reasons
that I will explain momentarily."
That summer Congress followed the course
mapped out by Fuchs, though it did so without
much subtlety." H.R. 8651 became the Railroad RetirementAct of 1935;11H.R. 8652 became the Carrier Taxing Actof 1935." The Taxing Act was calibrated to generate the amount
of revenue necessary to fund the pension payments authorized by the Retirement Act. This
stratagem set offsomething of a chase scene in
the Senate. Opponents of the plan, while stopping short of frankly accusing their colleagues
of subterfuge, tried to get the plan's sponsors
to confess that it was an attempt to circumvent
the Court's decision. Proponents of the bill,
assuring their interrogators that no such legerdemain was intended, struggled to keep a
straight face while explaining that there were

two bills rather than one because pension legislation properly Fell under the jurisdiction of
one committee while taxing bills fell under the
jurisdiction of another."0
When the District Court of the United States
for the District of Columbia granted the major
railroads an injunction restraining collection of
the tax in June of 1936,'4 it appeared that the
Fuchs strategy had foundered. Citing extensively to the congressional debates, 05 the district court concluded that the Carrier Taxing Act
and the Railroad Retirement Act were two parts
of a single scheme that, taken as a whole, contained many of the defects from which the 1934
act had suffered."t
The Railroad Retirement Board immediately took an appeal." ' B ut in December of
1936, before the Court ofAppeals could bear
argument in the case, President Roosevelt suggested that railway management and labor get
together and negotiate the terms of a railroad
retirement act. Representatives of all of the
major railway labor unions sat down with
agents of all of the major railroad companies,
members of the Railroad Retirement Board,
representatives of the Treasury Department and
members of Congress. By the summer of 1937
an agreement had been reached, and its provisions bad been embodied in the Carrier Taxing
Act of 1937, and the Railroad Retirement Act
of 1937. '" Congressmen praised the process
and the agreement as "a great tribute to the principle of collective bargaining."'" Such collective bargaining in the railroad industry had been
institutionalized by the Railway Labor Act of
1926,1" which the Court had unanimously sustained in a 1930 opinion written by Hughes
himself. " Sponsors professed their faith that
both the 1937 bilIs and the 1935 Acts were constitutional,"' Representative Clarence Lea
added, however, that "Friends of this legislation, in my judgment, need not particularly fear
ultimate Court disposal of this problem,""' For,
as Representative Carl Mapes explained, as part
of the deal "It is agreed between the representatives of the railroads and the brotherhoods
that they will not contest the constitutionality
of this legislation. .,and that they will use their
influence against having anyone else bring such
action. "1

The parties were true to their

words,"' and the retirement system they cre-
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let or hindrance."` Appropriations from the
general revenue, as distinguished from expenditures of designated funds collected from a
particular tax, simply could not be challenged
in the courts."' Such an appropriation might
exceed congressional authority to spend for
the general welfare, but the federal courts would
nevertheless refuse to restrain the expenditure.
"Thus," wrote Benjamin Wright, "the spending of billions of dollars in civilian relief, and in
the building of public works was beyond the
range of constitutional litigation." 2 As Wright
put it, "the principal way in which the Court
sustained... New Deal measures was by refising to pass upon the validity of the spending
power."m
And Wright was right. Throughout
Hughes' tenure, the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts repeatedly invoked the
Aellon doctrine in rejecting constitutional attacks on loans and grants made by one of the
most popular and important New Deal. relief
agencies, the Public Works Administration.'4
Undoubtedly because the Adellon doctrine
posed such an insuperable obstacle to securing judicial review, a vast array of New Deal
spending programs, all financed from general
revenue. never underwent constitutional challenge during Hughes' tenure. Examples include
the Civilian Conservation Corps.'2 the Farn
Credit Act, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 127 the Rural Electrification Administration Act,"' and the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1936." Indeed, the most

significant thing about the Hughes Court's
much-discussed spending power jurisprudence
is how little it actually mattered in light of the
taxpayer standing doctrine.
One major New Deal spending initiative that
the taxpayer standing doctrine did not shelter
from judicial review was the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.131 In an effort to boost
sagging crop prices resulting from chronic agricultural surpluses, the Act authorized the Secretary ofAgriculture to enter into contracts with
individual farmers. In the contract, the farmer
would agree to reduce his production of certain specified agricultural commodities in exchange for a benefit payment."' For political
reasons, however, President Roosevelt opposed
payment of the benefits from general rev-

enues.m" He did not want it to appear that the
nation's farmers were feeding at the public
trough. Instead, he insisted that the program

be and appear lobe self-financing."' The necessary funds were therefore to be derived from
a special excise tax on food processing. The tax
was designed to generate the amount of revenue required to meet the benefit payments
contracted for, and the act appropriated the proceeds of the tax for that purpose' A food
processor challenging the validity of the excise
therefore had standing to question the propriety of the expenditure to which the proceeds of
his tax payments were specifically devoted."3

And in United States v Butler'6 the Court
struck down the tax as a step in a scheme to
usurp the states' authority to regulate agricultural production.'"
But while the Butler opinion invalidated the
processing tax, the government continued to
make the benefit payments for which it had contracted. With the processing tax no longer enforced, no one had standing to challenge the
appropriations from general revenue by which

the payments were now funded.' Moreover.
within two months of the Butler decision Congress enacted a statute to replace the AAA.

The Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment
Act of 1936'11 authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to pay farmers to shift acreage from

soil-depleting crops to soil-conserving crops.
It was not sheer coincidence that the soil-depleting crops were the very surplus commodities whose production the AAA had sought to
control, while the soil-conserving crops were
not overproduced. Five hundred million dollars were appropriated to fund the payments,
but no companion taxing measure was enacted
to provide the necessary revenue. Opponents
of the measure complained that it was clearly
unconstitutional in light ofthe Butler decision.
But because there was no tax identified with
the expenditure, no one had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the payments."
Senator Daniel Hastings challenged defenders
of the bill's constitutionality "to add to it a tax
provision to supply the necessary money and
thus give to the American people an early opportunity to test its validity. Do not do the cowardly thing and separate the tax provision from

this bill, thus making it impossible to prevent

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES
the illegal spending ofat least a half billion dollars."a' But proponents of the bill, chastened
by the fate of the AAA, ignored this schoolyard taunt, and the law was enacted and implemented in its unchallengeable form.4 2
As Robert Stem observed, however, the soil
conservation strategy was "subject to the limitations of any voluntary system, even one in
which cooperation was made profitable. There
was no assurance that enough producers
would cooperate to permit a limitation of proAccordduction sufficient to raise prices."
ingly, in 1938 Congress turned to a regulatory
solution, enacting a second Agricultural Adjustment Act. The 1938 Act did not regulate
the production of staple crops - instead, it authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to prescribe and allocate marketing quotas for those
crops."' Drawing on a long line of precedents
holding that sales for subsequent shipments in
interstate commerce were subject to federal regulation, Congress sought to control prices by

controlling the supply of agricultural produce
moving in interstate commerce.' But where
could federal legislators have gotten the idea
that Congress might achieve through its commerce power what it could not attain using its
fiscal powers?

These are the opening lines of Roberts' discussion of the issue of federal power in Butler.
"Article 1, section 8 vests sundry powers in the
Congress," he wrote. "But two of its clauses
have any bearing upon the validity of the statute under review." The first was the Commerce
Clause. But, as Roberts observed, "the act under review does not purport to regulate transactions in intcrstate or foreign commerce. Its
stated purpose is the control of agricultural production, a purely local activity. . .. Indeed, the
Government does not attempt to uphold the
validity of the act on the basis of the commerce
clause, which, for the purpose of the present
case, may be put aside as irrelevant.""'
This was a curious passage. The act did
not purport to be an exercise of the power to
coin money or to establish post offices either-

nor did the government defend the act as exercises of those powers. Why, if he was to so
quickly lay it aside as inapposite "for the purpose of the preseni case," did Roberts even
bother to mention the conmnerce power?
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Learned students of the Court's federalism
jurisprudence thought they detected a familiar
signal. In 1921 Congress had sought to use its
fiscal powers to regulate sales of grain futures
on boards of trade. The Future Trading Act'
imposed a prohibitive tax on all such sales, and
then exempted from the tax all sales made on
boards of tradecomplying with federal regulations. The Court had declared the Act unconstitutional in Hill v Wallace"' in 1922. Chief
Justice Taft's opinion for a unanimous Court
held that the Act imposed a regulatory penalty
rather than a true tax, and was accordingly not
a valid exercise of the taxing power.' In dicta,
however, Taft had offered Congress an alternative means of achieving its goal. Noting that
Congress "did not have the exercise ofits power
under the commerce clause in mind and so did
not introduce into the act the limitations which
certainly would accompany and mark an exercise" of that power, Taft suggested that sales
of grain futures might be regulated under the
commerce power if "they are regarded by Congress, from the evidence before it, as directly
interfering with interstate commerce so as to be
an obstruction or a burden thereon." 5 0 Taft
even hinted that the revised statute be based
on the current ofcolnmerce doctrine"' the Court
had employed in upholding the Packers and
Stockyards Act' earlier in the Term.'" Congress took the hint and enacted the Grain Futures Act,' which the Court upheld as a legitimate exercise of the commerce power the fol[owing year in Chicago Board of Trade w
Olsen,?

Senator James Pope of Idaho, the principal
sponsor of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938, drew attention to this passage from Roberts' Butler opinion in his defense of the 1938
Act's constitutionality. "The legal theory on
which the pending bill is based is entirely distinct from that which provided the basis for the
Agricultural Adjustment Act," Pope explained." 6 Asserting the need to make the Act's
constitutional foundation in the Commerce
Clause explicit in the preamble, Pope observed
that in Butter "the Court said by reason of the
fact that there was no statement or claim in that
bill that we were proposing to regulate interstate corTunerce, it was a purely local transaction." 5 "As stated by Mr. Justice Roberts,"
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conference in which Brandeis made the case
for his scheme of federal-state cooperation.'"
The bill that ultimately emerged gave
Brandeis most ofwhat he had wanted. His early
initiative had framed the debate, and his position on the Court gave special weight to his
counsel,' This counsel was vindicated in the
spring of 1937. when the Court sustained the
Act against constitutional challenge.I" Figuring prominently in Justice Cardozos majority
opinion was the case of Florida v. Mellon. 1
While Justices McReynolds and Butler
maintained in dissent that any such program
was beyond congressional power to enact,
the author of Florida v. Mellon wrote separately. " Justice Sutherland had decided to retire from the Bench in March of 1937, and was
waiting only for the Court-packing controversy
'

having such laws. Brandeis replied by asking
whether Paul had considered the case of
Florida v Mellon. ' In that case die Taft Court
had unanimously upheld a federal inheritance
tax that granted a credit for state inheritance
taxes paid. States that had enacted inheritance
taxes feared losing their wealthy residents to
states like Florida that had no such taxes, and
the federal provision had been designed to level
the playing field. Brandeis was suggesting that
Congress could similarly use its taxing power
to encourage states to enact unemployment
compensation laws. Congress could simply
impose a uniform national payroll tax on all
employers, the proceeds to be paid into a federal unemployment insurance fund. Employers
would be allowed a credit against the federal
tax for any amount paid into a comparable insurance plan established by their own states.
States could then enact such insurance plans
free of the concerns that had previously restrained them.
That September the Justice wrote Paul and
Elizabeth a letter detailing his proposal for a
federal unemployment compensation statute.
Throughout the fall of 1933 Brandeis personally lobbied a number of high administration
officials to support his plan.'" At the same
time he had his friend Lincoln Filene help Paul
and Elizabeth organize a meeting of the influential to discuss his proposal. Among those in
attendance was Secretary of Labor Frances
Perkins.' Perkins commissioned Paul
Raushenbush and Thomas Eliot to draft a bill
based on Brandeis' proposal. When it had been
introduced in the House and the Senate,
Brandeis referred to the bill as "my federal excise tax. . . to offset irregularity of employment."'"
As the bill ran into resistance in Congress
and the White House, Elizabeth served as the
Justice's eyes, ears, and chief lieutenant, lobbying the administration and recruiting opinion leaders to support the Brandeis proposal 167
The Justice conscripted Felix Frankfurter to aid
her in the crusade for the "one true faith," and
met personally with Edwin Witte, the Executive
Director of Secretary Perkins' Committee on
Economic Security, in an effort to win him over.
Brandeis even extended his evangelism to the
Oval Office-he and Roosevelt had a personal
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to subside before taking his leave.' 7 1 His col-

league Justice Van Devanter had announced
his retirement May 18` six days before the Social Security Act opinions were delivered.'"
Under these circumstances, one might have
expected these Justices to quietly join the dissent of their fellow Horsemen, Instead they fashioned a dissent that provided precisely the sort
of consultation that Hughes had called for in
his own dissent in the railway pension case.
Sutherland began by announcing that he agreed
with most of what was said in the majority opinion."' In fact, the only element of the scheme
to which Sutherland objected was a provision
that required the states to pay the proceeds
from their own payroll taxes into the federal
treasury, and allowed withdrawals only by state
agencies approved by the federal board. Such
a requirement, in Sutherland's view, did not
"comport with the dignity of a quasi-sovereign
state;"" but the objectionable provision might
also be easily revised by Congress, Sutherland
explained. Indeed, he maintained that "everything which the act seeks to accomplish for the
relief of unemployment might have been accomplished. . . without obliging the state to

surrender, or to share with another government,
any of its powers.""' As Sutherland pointed
out, the Social Security Act's old-age pension
provisions had accomplished their goal in a
manner consistent with the Constitution, and
he and Van Devanter joined the opinion upholding them that very day."' Make one rela-
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was no doubt emblematic of the early New
Deal. In his eyes, the Attorney General's office
had not given the administration and Congress
the constitutional counsel they needed, but had
left that important task to the Court instead. In
his State of the Union address in January of
1937, Roosevelt had said, "The judicial branch
, also is asked by the people to do its part in
making democracy successful."' 4 In Hughes'
view, thejudicial branch had been doing its part
and more.
Every first year law student leams that constitutional law is not only about the pennissible ends of government; it is also about the
means by which such ends may be attained.
Yet our conventional renderings of the Hughes

Court obscure this important distinction, portraying the constitutional disputes of the New
Deal era as disagreements principally about

ends. In suppressing this elementary distinction between the legitimate objectives of government and the manner in which those objec-

tives may be achieved, we have lost sight of
the distinctively consultative role played by
the Court during Hughes' unique tenure. If we

will only remember what we have always known,

and what so many in the Congress of the 1930s
clearly understood, we will see that the Supreme
Court under the chief justiceship of Charles
Evans Hughes faced the economic and political crises of the 1930s neither on four feet nor
on three. but instead firmly on two.
*Thanks to Jason Tilly and Greg Kratofil for
excellent research assistance.
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653 (1935). John Hanna, "The Frazir-Lemke
Amendments to Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act,"
20 A.B.A. J 687, 689 (1934) and Reuben G. Hunt,
"Land Titles as Affected by Bankruptcy," 20 A.B.A. .1
719, 722 (1934), suggested the Act's constitutionality
was open to serious question.
Roberts, supra note 6.
"Bankruptcy: Federal Farm Mortgage Relief under
the Bankruptcy Act," supra note 6, at 173.
'Relief of Distressed Farmers Under the FrazierLernke Act?," supra note 6, at 87.
'The Frnzier-Lemkc Amendments to Section 75 of
the Bankruptcy Act," supra note 6, at 689. See also,
Roberts supra note 6, at 15 ("an outstanding examplc
of ill-conceived legislation"),
'Relief of Distressed Farmers Under the FrazierLemke Act?," supra note 6. at 87. See also "Bankruptcy: Federal Farm Mortgage Relief under the Bankruptcy Act," supra note 6, at 174.
2 Relief ot Distressed Farmers Under the Frazier-Lemke
Act?,"supra
note 6, at 87.
Id
Id.
-

ent had Roosevelt appointed a different Attorney General. Remarking that "the laws have
been poorly drafted," Hughes told Wheeler,
"We've had to be not only the Court but we've
had to do the work that should have been done
by the Attorney General."' 8 Hughes might have
been referring to any of a number of failures
on the part of the Justice Department, but one
was almost certainly on his mind. That very
month Congress was framing the Bituminous
Coal Act that Hughes and his Court would ultimately uphold. In 1935 a subcommittee of the
House Ways and Means Committee had asked
Attorney General Homer Cummings to appear
and offer his views concerning the Guffey Coal
Act's constitutionality.' Lawyers in his Justice Department had been convinced that the
labor provisions were unconstitutional,'" and
had reportedly told him so before his appearance."' But Cummings had refused to offer
Congress an opinion on the bill's constitutionality. Instead he had advised the subcommittee
"to push [the bill] through and leave the question to the courts."" For Hughes, this episode

"

tory of the New Deal would have been differ-
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"Bankruptcy: Federal Farm Mortgage Relief Under the
Bankruplcy Act," supra note 6, at 173.
- The New York Tines, July 1, 1934. at 21, quoted in
"Bankruptcy: Federal Farm Mortgage Relief Under
the Bankruptcy Act," supma note 6, at 173, a. 22, See
Note, "The New Frazier-Lemke Act: A Study-" 37
Colun. L, Rev. 1092, 1094 (1937).
295 U.S. 555 (1935)
See Lewis J. Paper. Brandeis 350 1983); Melvin
I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis and the Progressive
Tradition 162 (Oscar Handlin ed., 1981).
Those were:
"I. The right to retain the lien until the indebtedness thereby secured is paid.
2. The right to realize upon the security by a
judicial public sale.
3. The right to determine when such sale shall be
hed, subject only to the discretion of the court.
4. The right to protect its [the mortgagee's] interest in the property by bidding at such sale whenever
held, and thus to assure having the mortgaged propeity devoted primarily to the satisfaction of the debt,
either through receipt of the proceeds of a fair competitive sale or by taking the property itself.
5. The right to control meanwhile the property
during the period of default, subject only to the discretion of the court, and to have the rents and profits
collected by a receiver for the satisfaction of the debt.'
295
U.S. at 594-95.
Is
"Bankruptcy: Federal Farm Mortgage Relief under
the Bankruptcy Act," supra note 6, at 173.
Richard D. Friedman. Charles Evans Hughes as
Chief Justice, 1930-1941: The Complexities of
Moderation 231 (unpublished ). Phil. diss., Oxford
University, 1978).
See "The New Frazier-Lemke Act: A Study," supra
note 15. at 1095-96.
, 3002, 74" Cong lV Sess. (1935) was introduced
June 5, 1935, 79 Cong. Ree. 8666, 741* Cong. 1" Sess.
(1935); S. Rep. No. 985, 74" Cong. V' Sess (1935)
was submitted July 1, 1935. 79 Cong. Rec. 10461 A
comparable bill. H. R. 8728, 74* Cong. I Sess. (1935)
was introduced in the House June 29, 79 Cong. Rec.
10458, and reported with amendments August 16, 1935,
H4. Rep. No. 1808 74" Cong. I' Sess., 79 Cong Rec.
13494. H.R. 8728 was tabled and the Senate bill, as
amended, was passed in lieu thereof. 79 Cong. Rec.
14334. The Senate subsequently concurred in the House
amendments. Id at 13233-34.
"Bankruptcy: Federal Farm Mortgage Relief under
the Bankruptcy Act." supra note 6. at 173-74.
William A. Reppy. Comment, "Constittional LawBankruptcy-Frazier-Lemke Amendment," 10 So.
Cal. L. Rev 474. 476 (1937). See also Roberts, supro
note 6. "The constitutionality of this Act, because of
the fate of its predecessor, was the paramount consideration dtring its progress through Congress," one commentator pointed out. "Bankruptcy: Federal Farm
Relief Under the Bankniptcy Act," supra note 6, at
176. The new Act was passed "after extensive hearings," Roberts supra note 6, at 15, and "[t]he Judiciary
Committee of the Senate, . , including some of the
most able lawyers in the upper house on constitutional
questions, was unanimously in favor of the bill." "Bank-

ruptcy: Federal Farm Relief Under the Bankruptcy

Act." supra note 6, at 176, n. 39. The report of the
Senate Judiciary Committee began by stanbg that "This
bill has for is object . . the rewriting of subsection(s).
which has been held uncotstitutional, so as to conform to the decision of the Supreme Court." S. Rep.
No. 985, 740 Cong. I" Sess.. at I (1935). "We feel
that all the provisions in the rewritten subsection(s)
have been approved in principle in numerous decisions

by the Supreme Court." Id- at 3. The balance of the
report delailed how objectionable provisions had been
either omitted entirely, id. at 4, or modified so as to
resemble provisions that the Supreme Court had previously approved in other bankrupley cases Id. at 5.

7. H. Rep. No. 1808, 74*I Cong, 11 Sess. (1935), which
accompanied H.R. 8728, 74* Cong. I" Sess. (1935),
the House version of the bil, was virtually identical to
the Senate report

Asked by Senator McKellar whether the Judiciary
Comnittee was
tutional muster.
can only alflrm
sought, and the

satisfied that the bill would pass constiSenator Pat McCarran assured him, "I
our faith in its constitutionality. . .We
author of the bill sought, to relieve the

bill of those provisions which had been declared to
be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court , . - if any
bill can be enacted which will be constitutional it will
be a bill along these particular lines .. .Thecormittee
has studied the question carefully, and has inserted in the
bill a number of amendments seeking to have it confomi
to what we believe to be constitutional equirements... . I
believe we have obviated the features which might verge
upon unconstitutionality" 79 Cong Rec. 11971,74*Cong.
1 Sess. (July 29, 1935). See also 79 Cong Rec. 13411,
74'" Cong. I' Sess. (August 16, 1935) ("Mr Robinson:
The pending bill is intended to correct the features of tht

act which were held to be unconstisutional"l; id. ("Mr.
Bomh The pending bill is designed to, and it is believed it
does, avoid the unconstitutional features which were in that
law"): id at 13632 ("Mr. Borah: The purpose of the bill is
to avoid the objectionable feaues of the former act as they
were denounced by the Supreme Court." Borah then ex-

plained how the new bill did so); id. at 13633 (Sen. Borah
and Sen. Frzier explain to Sen. Hastings, to Hastings'satisfaction, why discretion vested in the court to order a sale
of lhe property earlier than 3 years from the date of bankruptcy rescued the Act from a constitutional difficulty that

plagued the earlier act; id at 13640 (Sen. Robinson concurs in Borah's and Frasier's explanation to Hastings); id,
at 13831 ("Mr. Lloyd: Mr. Speaker, this is a bill that has
been rewritten by the Committee on the Judiciary as a subslitute for the bill that the Supreme Court declared unconstintional. The committee has given very careful consideration to the bill. We have in no way reduced the security

of the morgagee. We have left his security intact, but we
have made it possible for the bankruptcy court to retain
jurisdiction for a period not to exceed 3 years. It is the
feeling of the committee that if the farmers havea breathing spell they will be able to work out their own salvation.
The bill we passed last year was declared unconstitutional
on the ground that it impaired the security of the mongagee") id. at 14331 ("Mr. Lemke: All this bill does is to
comply with the decision of the Supreme Courn. giving
the farmer n opportunity to get a breathing spell after he
goes into bankruptcy"); id- at 14332 ("Mr. Greever Dues
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the gentleman feel that the constitutional feature that was
decided by the Supreme Court is now Fully cured? Mr.
Lemke: I agree with the members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee that, with the amendment that Mr. Suirners
will offer, there will be no constitutional question about
the bill.
Mr. Kloeb: . . .is the gentleman now satisfied in his
own mind that this bill will pass the constitutional
test? Mr. Lemke: Yes; I am satisfied that this bill
now complies with the language of the Supreme
Court decision . . . .We have complied with the
decision. . ."); d. at 14333 ["Mr. McCormack: It is
the gentleman's opinion that this bill as now drafted
comes within the constitutional powers of the Congress? Mr Sumners As I explained, that opinion is
drawn largely from the unanimous opinion of the members of the Committee on the Judiciary, who have
more carefully examined it. bu from the examination
which I have made, which is rather casual, I did not
observe anything, if this amendment is adopted, which
would make me apprehensive as to its constitutionality"); Se Note, "Bankruptcy The Frazier-Lemke
Act," 22 Va. L. Rev 218, 219 (1935).
79 Cong. Rec. 11971, 74"' Cong. 1" Sess. (July 29,
1935). Ashursi added. "I emphasize the fact that the
Judiciary Committee examined many authorities, and
the committee carefully considesed this bill. - . . I
believe the learned members of the Judiciary Committee have done a good work on this bill. If it be within
the power of Congress to pass a law upon the subject,
I believe this bill will meet the objections of the Supreme Court. . . if Congress can constitutionally pass
stich a law at all it would be strtilar to this one." Id
Asked by Senator Copeland whether "this bill, in the
fomi in which it is now prmsented to us. is likely to run
the gauntlet of the courts and to be declared valid
legislation?" Senator Borah responded that "that was
the conclusion which was reached by the Judiciary Cornmittee, including myself. The Judiciary Cornmittee
devoted their effor to working out the measure so as
to bring it within the Constitution and obviate the
objections made by the Court to the previous act. I do
not think there was any disagreement in the Judiciary
Committee that we had finally framed such a measure.
It is my opinion that it will run the galu}ntlet of the
courts . . . in my opinion, this bill is constitutional.'
Copeland then asked Borab whether he had taken "an
opposite view regarding the original Frazier-l-emke
Act?" Borah responded that he had "opposed that
measure here on the floor, as the RECORD will
show . . For the reason that I thought it was unconstitutional," Copeland replied, "At least, though, it appealed to the Senator's heart and be would have been
glad to support it if he had thought it to be constiu
tional"' To this Borah responded: "I would have been
anxious to see the measure passed if I had thought it
would have been able to escape the constitutional objection Id. at 13642.
Several Senators objected to a provision in the Senate bill that would have limited the right of the mortgagee to bid on the property at auction on t&e ground
that it "would invalidate this measure if it were retained" Id. at f1634 (objection of Sen. Robinson); see
also id. at 13413 (objection of Sen. Robinson); id. at
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13632-33 (objections of Sen. Robsmson and Sen. Logan); id at 13641 (objection of Sen. Tydings). Senator
Frazier was way ahead of them, and announced his
intention to offer an amendment striking the objectionable provision, which had already been removed
from the House version by the House Judiciary Committee. Senator Borah concurred, saying "I do not
wish to urge it [the provision objected to], if it be
regarded of doubtful validity," id. at 13633, and the
objectionable provision was excised by amendment.
Id. at 13643-44. See also id. (Borah and Ashurst assure Logan that the objectionable provision will be
taken out of the bill); id. at 13641 (Borah informs
Tydings of the agreement to strike the provision),
Senator Robinson also objected to a proposed '-provision which I think will cause the raising of another
constitutional question on this bill" and would "endanger the validity of the proposed act." Id at 13641. See
also id. at 13634-36, 13640-41. Senator Ashurst agreed
to its exclusion, and the amendment that would have
included the objectionable provision was defeated. Id
at 13643. In the House Representative Sunmers sought
further to secure the Act's constitutional foundation,
offering an amendment, promptly agreed to, securing
to the mortgagee the right to have foreclosure on the
property if the debt was not paid in fulL Id- at 1433233.
When the bill was introduced in the House, congressman Lemke announced, "This bill was very carefully considered by a subcommittee of the Committee
on the Judiciary of both the House and the Senate, and
by the full Committee on te Judiciary of both the
House and the Senate, and last Monday it was passed
after an hour and a half discussion on the question of
its constitutionality, without a dissenting vote, in the
United Stales Senate." Id. at 14332. In a concluding
defense of the bill's constitutionality Sumners maintained that "although there was doubt with reference
to the first bill[,] I understand from my colleagues on
the cotmnittee there is not now any doubt as to the
constitutionality of this bill .. . . id, at 14333. The
bill was then passed by a voice vote. The Cornell Law
Review observed that "the lack of opposition in both
chambers seems to indicate that the legislators were
satisfied with the present Act," and that "the consensus of Congressional opinion seems to be that the
rights of the creditor have been fully protected. . ."
"Bankruptcy: Federal Farm Mortgage Relief Under
the Bankruptcy Act," supra note 6, at 174, 176.
Comment. "Constitutional Law-Fifth Amendment-Invalidity of Fra-zier-Lemke Amendment to
the Bankruptcy Act," 35 Catern. L. Rev 1136, 1138
(1935). Reaching the same conclusion were Note,
"Constitutionality of the New Frazier-Lemke Amendment to the Bankruptcy Act," 4 G.W L. Rev 105, 114
(1935); "Bankruptcy: Federal Farm Mortgage Relief
Under the Bankruptcy Act," supra note 6, at 171,
176; Rufus K. Breihan, "The New Frazter-Lemke
Amendment," 41 Conm. L J. 152 (19363; Note. "Constitutional Law-Due Process-Validity of Amended
Frarier-Liemke Amendment to Bankruptcy Act." 84
U Pa. L. Rev. 545, 546-47 (1936)
Not all commentators were so optimistic. See,
e.g.. Roberts, supra note 6; Note, "Constitutional
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Law-Bankruptcy-Validity of Amended Frazier-Lenke
Farm Mortgage Moratorium Law," 13 N.YU L. Q. 465
(1936); John Hanna,"New Frazier-Lermke Act," I MAo L
Rev I (1936); Reinhardt, supra note 6, at 21, 29.
The majority of the lower federal courts hearing cha Ilenges to the revised act held it unconstitutional. See Comment, "Constitutional Law-Bankruptcy-Frazier-Lemke
Amendment," 10 So. Ca. L. Rev. 474, 476 (1937). For
comments criticizing these decisions as resting on a misunderstanding of the Radford opinion, see Note, "Constitutional Law -Due Process Validity of Amended
Frazier-Lerake Amendment to Bankruptcy Act," 84 U Pa.
L. Rev 545, 546 (1936); Note, "Bankruptcy-FrazierLemke Act-Due Process-Full Faith and Credit,"4 G. W
L. Rev 525, 526 (1936); Note, "Bankruptcy---Constitutionality of the New Frazier-Lemke Act," 30 Ill L. Rev
794, 795 (1936); "The New Frazier-Lemke Act: A Study,"
supra note 15, at 1096; Note, "Constitutional Law - Due
Process and the Frazier-Lemke Acts," 35 Alich. L. Rev
1130, 1134-35 (1937). See also Wright v. Vinion Branch
Bank, 300 U.S_ 440,457 (1937).
300 US. 440 (937).
Brief on Behalf of Robert Page Wright, p. 2. "When
the Supreme Court held the original Frazier-I.emke
Act unconstitutional in [Rodford]," the brief explained,
the present act was introduced in both the
Senate and the House. It was referred to the
Judiciary Committees of the Senate and the
House and both of these Committees referred
it to Subcommittees for study and consideration with the purpose of complying with the
court's decision.
The author of the bill was called in by
both of the Subcommittees. The Act was then
carefully considered sentence by sentence.
section by section, with the decision of the
Supreme Court so as to comply with that decision. Many changes were made by the Subcommittees.
After the Subcommittees had finished
their work the bill was reintroduced with the
changes and amendments made by the Subcommittees and then was brought up before
the Committees of the Whole of both the
Senate and the House There again te hill was
gone over sentence hv sentence. paragraph
by paragraph and section by section. carefully
considered and compared with the decision of
the Supreme Court. and further amendments
made.
The bill was then brought up on the
floor of the Senate and the House and funher
debated with a view of having it comply with
the decision of the Supreme Court and was
finally passed . without a dissenting vote in
either House.
Id. at 9 (emphasis in original). This theme was again
emphasized at oral argument. 300 U.S. at 443. See
"Constitutional Law-Due Process and the FrazierLemke Acts," supra note 30, at 1136 n,3 L
Brief on Behalf of Robert Page Wright, at 3-6.
Id. at 10-11. At argument Wright's counsel main-

tained: "There is nothing novel in the new Act, it
simply applies well established principles of bankruptcy
law to agriculture. This may appear novel, but there is
no provision of the Act which the bankruptcy courts
have not already passed uponn" 300 U.S. al 443.
Compare the Brief in Response to Petition for

Writ of Certiorari, at I I: "Respondent respectfully
submits that a study of the present act, and of the

opinion of this Honorable Court in the Radford case,
and of the first Frazier-.emke Act, that was by that
case held unconstitutional, will disclose a saudied effort
by the draftsmen of the present act to give an appearance of compliance with the Radford decision, while at
the same time it takes away from the creditor the
same substantive right in specific property that was
illegally to be accomplished by the first Frazier-Lemke
Act,"
300 U.S. at 456-57.
Id. at 464 n.9,
Id. at 458 n.2.

Id at 470.
West Coast Hotel Co. v Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937),
NLRB v Friedrman-Harty Marks Clothing Co., 301
U.S. 58 (1937); NLRB v Fruebauf Trailer Co., 301
U.S. 49 (1937); NLRR s Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. I (1937).
Steward Mach, Co. v Dasis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937);
Carmichael v SouThern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S.
495 (1937).
Comment. "Constitutional Law-Frazier-Lemke
Act-Judicial Discretion as Affecting Validity," 37
Colum. L. Re. 1005, 1006 (1937), See also "Constitutional Law-Due Process and the Frazier-Lemuke
Acts," qupra note 30, at 1 135-36 ("perhaps the most
significant conclusions to be drawn about the recent
decisions of the Supreme Court in the Radford and
Wright cases and the history of the two acts are. - that
hastily drafted, more or less ill-considered legislation
(as to means) will not survive the test of due process,
while carefully worked out and planned statutes on the
same subject and accomplishing substantially the same
objects will")
0 48 Stat. 195, 200 (1933).
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 40512 (1935).
293 U.S. at 410. The response to this embarrassment was the establishment of the Federal Regiser, in
which such orders would thenceforth be officially published. Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics
of Upheaval, 254-55 (1960).
46
Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L,
Ickes, 247 (1953).
293 U.S. at 430.
Id. at 421-30. "The Constitution has never been
regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies
and establishing standards, while leaving to selected
instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within
prescribed limits and the determination of facts to

which the policy as declared by the legislature is to
apply. Without capacity to give authorizations of that
sort we should have the anomaly of a legislative power
which in many circumstances calling for its exertion
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would be but a futility, But the constant recognition of
the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the
wide range of administrative authority which has been
developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to
obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if
our constitutional system is to be maintained." Id. at

421.
"There is no requirement. no definition of circumstances and conditions in which the transportation is
to be allowed or prohibited " Id, at 430.
Id at 415. Referring to Section I of the Act, which
set forth the Act's policy in general terms. Hughes
wrote, "This general outline of policy coitains nothing as to the circumstances or conditions in which
transportation of petroleum or petroleum products
should be prohibited,-nothing as to the policy of
prohibiting, or not prohibiting, the transportation of
production exceeding what the States allow. The general policy declared is 'to remove obstructions to the
free flow of interstate and foreign commerce.' As to
production, the section lays down no policy of limitation." Id. at 417-18. "The Congress did not undertake
to say thai the transportation of 'hot oil' was injurious. The Congress did not say that transportation of
that oil was 'unfair competition.' The Congress did
not declare in what circumstances that transportation
should be forbidden, or require the President to make
any determination of any facts or circumstances.
Among the numerous and diverse objectives broadly
stated, the President was not required to choose. The
President was not required to ascertain and proclaim
the conditions prevailing in the industry which made
the prohibition necessary. The Congress left the matter to the President without standard or rule, to be
dealt with as he pleased. The effort by ingenious and
diligent construction to supply a criterion still permits
such a breadth of authorized action as essentially to
commit to the President the functions of a legislature
rather than those of an esecutive or administrative
officer executing a declared legislative policy. We find
nothing in section I which limits or controls the authority conferred by section 9(c),' Id. at 418-19. Nor
could any of the Act's other sections "be deemed to
prescribe any limitation of the graint of authority in
section 9(c)" Id. at 419-10.
"If section 9(c) were held valid, it would be idle to
pretend that anything would be lefl of limitations upon
the power of the Congress to delegate its law-making
function. The reasoning of the many decisions we
have reviewed would be made vacuous and their distinctions nugatory. Instead of performing its law-making function, the Congress could at will and as to such
subjects as it chose transfer that function to the President or other officer or to an administrative body. The
question is not of the intrinsic importance of the particular statute before us, but of the constitutional processes of legislation which are an essential part of our
system of government." Id. at 430. See Roy G. Tulane,
"Constitutional Law-The Oil Control Provisions of
the N.L.R.A,," 10 Wise, L Rev 301, 304-05 (1935).
Id at 426.
Id at 430, (quoting Hampton & Co. v United States,
276 U.S. 394, 409-II (1928)). The opinion went on
to identify "anolher objection to the validity of the
50
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prohibition laid down by the Executive Order under
section 9(c). The Executive.Order contains no finding, no statement of the grounds of the President's
action in enacting the prohibition. Both section 9(c)
and the Executive Order are in notable contrast with
historic practice. . by which declarations of policy are
made by the Congress and delegations are within the
framework of that policy and have relation to facts
and conditions to be found and stated by the President
in the appropriate exercise of delegated authority. If it
could be said that from the four corners of the statute
any possible inference could be drawn of particular
circumstances or conditions which were to goveni the

exercise of the authority conferred, the President could
not act validly without having regard to those circum-

stances and conditions. And findings by him as to the
existence of the required basis of his action would be
necessary to sustain that action, for otherwise the case
would still be one of an unfettered discretion as the
qualification of authority would be ineffectual. . . To
hold that [the President] is free to select as he chooses

from the many and various objects generally described
in the first section, and then to act without making
any finding with respect to any object that he does
select, and the circumstances property related to that
object, would be in effect to make the conditions inoperative and to invest him with an uncontrolled leg-

islative power." 293 U.S. at 431-32. Indeed, such
findings were mandated by the requirements of the

Fifth Amendment: "if the citizen is to be punished
for the crime of violating a legislative order of an
executive officer, or of a board or commission, due

process of law requires that it shall appear that the
order is within the authority of the officer, board
or commission, and, if that authority depends on
determinations of fact, those determinations must be
shown.' Id. at 432.
52 Comment, "Constitutional Law-Delegation of
Legislative Powers -- National Industrial Recovery

Act." 8 So. Cal. L. Rev 226, 229 (1935). See also
Charles K. Burdick, "Constitutional Aspects of the
New Deal in the United States," 13 Can. B. Rev 699.
710 (1935) ("the particular situation. . can be met

easily by a more definite congressional declaration of
policy and purpose to control the President's future
exercise of discretion"); Carl H. Baester, "A Suggested

Classification of the Decisions on Delegation of Legislative Power," 15 B. V. L. Rev. 507, 529 (1935) ("If
a standard-a reasonable one-had been provided it is
fair to assume that a contrary result would have been

reached").
"Section 9(c) of the National Industrial Act could
have been reenacted by the use of the same language
that was in the original act with probably 10 to 20
words additional to bring it within the rule laid down by

the Supreme Court." 79 Cong. Rec 2135-36, 74n Cong
I" Sess. (February 18, 1935).
Joseph H. Mueller, "Constitutional Law-Delegation of Legislative Power-National Industrial Recov-

ery Act," 23 Ill B. J 269, 270 (1935), (citing Theodore
W. Cousens, "The Delegation of Federal Legislative
Power to Executive Officials," 33 Mich. L Rev. 512,
544 (1935) ("those who look to the Supreme Court
for protection against extensive delegations to the
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of authority to tlhe President to determine anything before such law would become operative.

-

Executive should not take too much confidence from this
decision. No substantial barrier to delegation is raised by
the Panama Refitting Co. case. A standard must be set, but
previous cases teach how vague such a standard may be.
. .The Court has indeed set a limit, but it is formal rather
than substantial and the slightest care in bill drafting will
avoid infringing it. All in all, we may conclude that the
case changes rolhing and that its importance can very easily be exaggerated")). See also Note. "Delegation of Power
by Congress,"48 Har. L. Rev 798, 806 (1935) (the new
requirement [of a finding] may accomplish no more than
to add a formality to the issuance of an executive order").
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Remarks at Press Conference
(Jan. 9, 1935) quoted in Schlesinger, supra note 45, at
255,"(T]he mistakes involved seemed easily remediable,
and the administration look the adverse decision philosophically." ld William Swindler agreed"careless draftsmanship- . , proved to be the crux of the mailer, and the
optimists among the Presidential advisers professed to see
no serious threat to their general statutory program emerging.. --Inthe'hot oil'deision. - the optimists took heart
from the fact that the point was a procedural one which
could be remedied by statute. . . ." Swindler. Court and
Constitution in the Twentieth Century: The New Leality, 1932-1968 33 (1970).
Iekes, supra note 46, at 273.
S. 1190, 74*1 Cong. 11 Ses. (1935), introduced at 79
Cong. Rec 632, 74 Cong. 1 Seas. (January 18, 1935).
The Committee on Mines and Mining reported the bill
back favorably the same day. id at 649. The two-andone-half page report, which consisted principally of
quotations from the Panama Refining opinion, characterized the new bill as "a substantial but somewhat
elaborated reenactment of section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act-. . . . See S. Rep. No.
14, 74" Cong. I" Sess. 1 (1935). The report of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Comrierce, issued on Valentine's Day. explained what had
been wrong with section 9(c) and how the new bill
repaired the problem.
Section 9(c) did nor declare anything
to be illegal until the President should so declare. In making such declaration, the Congress, in the opinion of the Supreme Court,
did not require the President to adhere to any
legislative policy, or to follow any standard
laid down by it, or in fact to be guided by any
rule. No particular circumslances, or conditions were set forth as a perquisite [sic] to
the President's declaration. The Supreme
Court construed this action by Congress to
be an invalid delegation of authority.
In S. 1 190, as amended, Congress declares in no uncertain terms that such shipments, or transportation, in interstate comrmerce as defined therein, is prohibited, and
violations of such Federal law is Isic] punishable in the manner prescribed immediately
upon the passage of this act, therefore, shipments in interstate cormmerce of petroleum
and petroleum products, as defined, become
a violation of the law and there is no delega-

H. Rep. No. 148, 7411 Cong, 1" Sess., at 3-4 (1935); see
Comment, "Interstate Regulation of 'Hot Oil,' 23
Geo L . 487. 492-94 (1935).
In the Hot Oil Cases, Connally remarked on the
floor, "The Supreme Court held and I think properly so that the Congress did not possess rhe power
to delegate authority to the President to put the prohibition in effect or not in effect as he might determine. . - The Court indicated, in harmony with other
decisions heretofore made, that had the Congress set
up a standard or a mcasure by which the President

could determine when and when not the shipment of
oil should be prohibited the act would probably have
been held valid." 79 Cong Rec. 693-94, 74* Cong. I"
Sess. (January 21, 1935).
As Connally explained it. "In the first section of the
bill there is a declaration of the policy of the Congress.
One of the suggestions in the decision of the Supreme
Cout was that Congress had not declared any particu-

lar policy but had merely delegated its authority to the
President. The declaration of policy here is that in
order to remove the burden of interference with interstate commerce by contraband oil, and in order to

cooperate with the various siates to that end, the Congress prohibits the interstate shipment of oil and oil
products when the particular oil has been produced or

refined or handled in violation of some State law or
some valid regulation or order of the State commission. - . - Section 2 then absolutely prohibits the shipment in interstate or foreign commerce of oil pro-

duced in violation of state law or regulations." Id.
Id. See also remarks of Sen. Connally, id at 753;
remarks of Rep. Dies, id. at 2124 remarks of Rep.
Wolverton. id. at 2135-36; remarks of Rep. Dempsey.
id. at 2150. Senators King and Borab raised delegation
objections to Section 3 of the bill, which authorized
the President or his duly designated agent or agency to
make such rules and regulations as might be found
necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of
the act. Id at 762. Connally responded that this sort
of delegation had been repeatedly upheld by the Court,
citing as an example United States v Grimanud, 220
U.S. 506, in which the Secretary of Agriculture had
been given very broad power to make rules and regulalions with respect to the forest reserve. 79 Cong. Rec

763, 7 41 Cong, I` Sess. (January 22 1935). Horah
responded: "Yes; I know the Supreme Court has upheld
in some instances these regulations, under certain circumstances. but I invite the Senator's attention to the
fact that when these cases were first presented to the
Supreme Court of the United States, rules and regulations, the violation of which constituted a crime, were

held invalid. The Court modified its position upon the
question. I venture to say that if we continue to make
these rules and regulations by the thousands and thousands, the violations of which constitute a crime, the
Supreme Court will go back some of these days to the
very sound and safe rule which it announced in the
beginning when it first dealt with the question. There

may come a time, as in the decision in the oil case,

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES
when the Court will conclude a danger point has been
reached." Id. ai 763-64. Connally replied, saying, "In
a large measure I agree with the Senator in the idea
that it is rather drastic to authorize any department to
make rules and regulations punishable by fine or imprisonment, but the principle has been established and
followed over and over again. Under this particular
measure, of course, the Department cannot prescribe
any rule beyond the scope of the direct authority which
the Congress grams." Id at 764. See also the colloquy
between Rep. Disney and Rep. Cole of Maryland, id. at
2146.
Id, at 764; id. at 2150. Hughes' specific advice on
how to frame a constitutional delegation was not
wasted. Section 4 of the Connally Act provided that
"Whenever the President finds that the amount of
petroleum and petroleum products moving in interstate commerce is so limited as to be the cause,
in whole or in part, of a lack of parity between
supply. . and consumptive demand. . . resulting in an
undue burden on or restriction of interstate commerce
in petroleum or petroleum products, he shall by proclamnttion declare such finding, and thereupon the provisions of section 3 [prohibiting interstate shipment
of "bot oil") shall be inoperative until such time as the
President shall find and by proclamation declare that
the conditions which gave rise to the suspension of the
operation of the provisions of such section no longer
exist." c. 18, section 4, 49 Stat. 30 (1935). As Representative Charles Wolverton observed, "The House
committee, . . has placed in this bill something of a
safety valve, in that the President is authorized and
empowered to suspend the act if it should appear that
the limitation or control of production of crude oil
was detrimental to the national interest. If that provision had not been placed in this bill, it would have left
the entire matter to the judgment of an oil producing
state as to what quantity of crude oil should go into
interstate cornerce. . .. [The bill as amended] has not left
it entirely to the State to determine, without regard to the
rights ofthe consuming public, how much oil shall go into
interstate commerce. Provision has been made that whenever the President finds there is such a limitation of production as might be harmful to the consuming public he
can act to suspend the provisions of this bill. Thus there is
a safety valve provided in this bill . ..," id. at 2136. The
House report explained the manner in which the proviso
had circumscribed the President's discretion in compliance
with the Panama Refining decision-"The committees
inserted the proviso found in the bill, which does not arbitrarily delegate to the President the power to declare the
law to be inoperative in his sole discretion, but only when
he finds that thecircumstances exist which are set forth in
the stanne. Congress says to the President in effect in the
language of the amendment-
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den on, or restriction of, interstate commerce
in petroleum and the products thereof

Under this language the President, we assume, will require a factual basis for his finding, that factual finding
being addressed to what limitation there is upon ihe
supply moving in interstate commerce and whether
there is a lack of parity between such supply and demand. This is a definite requirement, a statement of
circumstances and lbe imposition of conditions, all of
which must be determined before the President can
act. This power in the President presupposes a definite
finding and a statement of the facts for the President's
action before any such action is taken." H. Rep. No.
148, 745 Cong. " Sess., at 4 (1935). See also H. Rep.
2155, 74 " Cong. 1' Seas., at 5 (1935). There are no
reported cases challenging the validity of section 4.
Comment, "Constitutional Law Delegation of
Legislative Authority," I Mo. L. Revt 68, 70 (1936).
See also Isador Loeb, "Constitutional Interpretation
in a Transitional Period," 21 St. Louis L. Rev 95, 102

L1936).
Note, "Constitutional Law-Delegation of Legislative Powers-'Hot Oil'-NIRA," 3 O.W L, Rev 391,
392-93 (1935).
65
Note, "Delegation of Legislative Powers to the Executive-1he NIRA Oil Case," 2 U Chi. L. Rev 632,
636 (1935). For other optimistic assessments of the
Act's chances before the Court, see Note, "Constitutional Law-Delegation of Powers-Validity of Act
of Congress Conferring Discretionary Authority Upon
the President," 12 N.YU. L. Q. Rev 520, 522 (1935);
George K. Ray & Harvey Wienke, "Hot Oil on lUncharted Seas of Delegated Powers," 29 Ill. L. Rev 1021,
1034-35 (1935); Comment, "Interstate Regulation of
'Hot Oil,"' 23 Geo L. J. 487, 494 11935).
See Genecov v Federal Petrleum Board, 146 F 2d

596 (5th Cir, 1944); The President of the United States
v Skeen, 118 F. 2d 58 (5th Cir., 1941); Hurley v
Federal Tender Board No. 1, 108 F 2d 574 (5th Ci.,
1939); Griswold v The President q the United States,

82 F. 2d 922 (5th Cir., 1936); President qf the United
States v Arlex Refineries Sales Corp., II F. Supp 189

(S.D. Tex., 1935),
United States v. Powers, 307 U.S. 214 (1939).
Ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991, 995-1001, section 4, part It
(1925) (repealed 1937, as noted in 15 U.SC. sections
801-827).

Id at 1001-02, section 4, part Ill,
See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal
Court. The Structure of a Constitutional Revo-

lution 159-61 (1998),
298 U.S. 238 (1936).
Id. at 312-16.
Id, at 317-24 (separate opinion of Hughes, Cl.)
14

Id. at 324 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). Cardozo main-

You are permitted to declare the existence of
the facts by which this law shall be inoperative whenever you find that the supply of
petroleum and the products thereof, moving
in interstate commerce, is so limited as to
cause in whole or in part a Jack of parity between supply. including imports, and demand,
including exports, resulting in an undue bur-

tained that "the suits are premature in so far as they
seek a judicial declaration as to the validity or invalidity of the regulations in respect of labor," and accordingly did not consider the validity of those provisions.
Id.
Id at 336.
See Comment, "Constitutional Law-The Guffey
Coal Act Decision and the Future for Federal Price
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Regulation," 160re. L_ Rev. 67, 79(1936) (noting ihat "by
stabilizing [through price regulation] an industry in desperate economic plight and placing it in a position where
it can afford to pay decent wages to labor. Congress may
avert much of the damage to the public welfare from labor
difficulties, and much ofthe need for direct regulation of
wages, hours, and other labor conditions, which cannot be
constitutionally imposed, in the opinion of the Supreme
Cour- at the present time"). See also Comment. "The Bi-

tuminous Coat Act of 1937," 25 Geo. L J 986,989 (1937);
11. Rep. No. 294, 75' Cong. I" Sess., at 2 (1937) ("It is the
opinion of the committee that the stabilization of prices
which the bill seeks to offectand the resulting guarantee to

operators ofa Iair price for their coal will go a long way
toward stabilization of labor conditions in the industry and
toward the guarantee to the miners ofsatisfactory working
conditions and a living wage").

See "Constitutional Law-The Cuffey Coal Act
Decision," supra note 76, at 67, 71-79; Note, "The
Final Phase of the Schechter Episode; Carter v Carter
Coal Co.," 5 Brook/yn L. Rev 454. 469-70 (1936);
Comment, "The Bitumnous Coal Conservation Act

of 1937." supra nole 76, at 992-93
50 Stat. 72 (1937).
See S. Rep. No. 252. 75" Cong. I" Sess.. at 4-5
(1937); H. Rep. No. 294, 75" Cong. I" Sess., at 11-14
(1937); remarks of Rep. Dirksen, 81 Cong Rec 2120,
75" Cong. P' Sess. (1937); remarks of Sen. Guffey, id].
at 2950-52; remarks of Sen. Borah, id. at 2956; remarks of Sen. Neely, id; remarks of Rep. Vinson, id. at
2033-34, 2036-38; remarks of Rep. Jenkins, id. at
2041-42.
See, e.g., Nebbia v New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539
934) (McReynolds. J, dissenting).
291 U.S. 502 (1934); Hl. Rep. No. 294, t1 754
Cong. I" Sess. (1937): remarks of Rep. Guffey, 81
Cong. Rec. 2953, 75* Cong. I` Sess. (1937); remarks
of Rep. Vinson, id at 2030. 2034. 2038-39: remarks
of Rep. Jenkins. id. at 2042.
Id at 2039. See also Comment, "Constitutional
Law- Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause to
Regulate Labor Conditions in Local Industry and Fix
the Price of Sales in Interstate Commerce," 34 Mich.

L. Rev. 1167, 1178-79 (1936) (suggesting that Nebbia

both public and private interest, if it he fairly within
delegated power out obligation is to sustain it. On the
other hand, though we should think the measure embodies a valuable social plan and be in entire sympathy
with its purpose and intended results, if the provisions

go beyond the boundaries of constitutional power we
must so declare." 295 U.S. at 346.
Id. at 348-57.
Id- at 362.
"Classes of persons held to be improperly brought
within the range of the Act could be eliminated. Criti-

cisms of the basis of payments, of the conditions prescribed for the receipt of benefits, and of the requirements of contributions, could be met, Even in place of
a unitary retirement system another sort of plan could
be worked out," Id at 375.
Id at 375.
Id, at 374-75,
See. e.g., Conment, "Constitutional Law-Railroad Retirement Act." 4 Fordham L_ Rev 498, 499.
501 (1935); Comment, "Constitutional Law--Due
Process-nterstate Commerce-Power of Congress
to Provide for Compulsory Retirement and Pension

System for Carriers," 20 Minn L Rev 49, 55-56 (1935);
Comment, "The Railroad Retirement Acts'. 10 St.
John's L. Rev 53, 58-59 (1935); Comment, "Constitutional Law-Railroad Retirement Acts," 25 Geo. L.
J. 161, 173 (1936); Comment, "Constitutional LawThe Railroad

Retirement Act--Interstate Com-

inerce-Due Process," 33 Mich. L. Rev 1214, 1220
(1935): Bruce R. TrimbleL "The Judicial Treatment of
the New Deal," 4 Kan. City L_ Rev 104, 107 (1936).
See also "Radio Address of Ho-. John A. Martin. of
Colorado, on March 6, 1937," reprinted in 81 Cong,
Rec. Appendix 435-37, 754 Cong. I" Sess. (1937);
Samuel tle-del. Charles Evans Hughes and the
Supreme Court 231-32 (1951); William E.
Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn 46-47
Q995).
Ralph F. Fuchs, "Judicial Method and the Constinitionality of the NLRA.." 20 St. Louis L. Rev 199
209 n.34 (1935) (emphasis mine). See also Comment
"Constitutional Law--Unconstitutionality of the Railroad Retirement Act- -Limitation on Power of Congress Over the Instrurnentalities of Interstate Com-

provided authority for federal regulation of the price
of coal sold in interstate commerce); "Constitutional
Law-The Guffey Coal Act Decision," supra note 76,

merce," 35 Coltn. L. Rev. 932, 933 (1935) (suggest-

at 76-79.

fore permit congressional legislation creating a pension system for railway employees).

See, e.g., remarks of Rep. Jenkins, 81 Cong. Rec.
2041, 7 5'" Cong. I' Sess. (March 9, 1937).

Ralph Baker. The National Bituminous Coal
Commission 66 (1941). See remarks of Rep. Jenkins,
81 Cong. Rec. 2044, 75* Cong. P' Sess. (March 9,
1937); remarks of Rep. Casey, id. at 2047.
See Cushman, supra note 70, at 195.

81 Cong. Rec. 2952, 75' Cong " Sess. (J937),
Id at 2032.
Sunshine Anthracite Coal v Adkins, 3 10 Li'S. 38 1.
396-97 (1940).
Act of June 27, 1934. c. 868, 48 Stat. 1283.
'The fact that the compulsory schetne is novel is,
of course, no evidence of unconstitutionality. Even
should we consider the Act unwise and prejudicial to

ing that the powers to tax and spend were "broader in
scope than the commerce power," and might there-

Id.

See Note, "Constitutional Law-Railroad Retirement Acts," supra note 96, at 165-66, 170.
Asked by Senator Duffy- whether the revised Railroad Retirement Act met the objecttons raised by the
Court in Alton, Senator Wagner responded that A/ion

"was based upon the ground that we had no authority,
under the power to regulate interstate commerce, to
retire old railway employees. . - Under this bill. , . we
are proceeding on an entirely different theory, namely,

the power of Congress to impose taxes." 79 Cong.
Rec. 13646, 74" Cong. I' Sess. (August 19,1935). In
the House, Rep. Monaghan pointed out that Roberts'
Alton opinion had held "that the power 'to regulate
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commerce' did not carry with it the power to provide
pensions. He did not say we could not pay an annuity
out of the Treasury of the United States. [Thai] is the
theory of this bill." Id at 13671L
49 Stat. 967 (1935)
49 Stat. 974 (1935).
It all began when Senator Hastings asked why the
provisions imposing the taxes and the provisions auIborizing the appropriations were not all in one bill, as
they were in the Social Security Act. Senator Wagner
responded cryptically that it was "a matter of procedure." Senator Robinson came to Wagner's rescue, explatining that "Normally the Committee on Interstate

Commerce has jurisdiction of railroad pension legislation. Always the Finance Committee has jurisdiction
of tax legislation. In the case of the social-security
bill, it was my personal thought that it would be better
to separate the legislation, to have the administrative
and other provisions in one measure, and the tax provision in a separate measure; but that course was not
followed. in the case of the railroad pensions, that
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mittee of the Senate, the Interstate Commeree Committee of the House last year devoted several monthrs
to the study of this whole subject. Hearings covered a
penod of at least one month. Experts upon this ques-

tion, those representing the railroad point of view and
those representing the employees' point of view, were

heard. In view of this long study, it would seem a ludicrous procedure to send the measure deliberately to
another committee which would have to begin the

hearings all over again and study the question de novo,"
Id.
Robinson then laid hare the issue Hastings had
been sniffing around. "I assure the Senator from Delaware that the course which has been pursued does not
involve any legerdemain, if that is what the Senator is
intimating." "I am glad the Senator assures me of that,"
Hastings replied, "becatise I arn very suspicious ofit . . . In
this ease a very clever thing has been done, by design or
otherwise, which is to separate the granting of a pension

from the levying of rthe tax, .. . I say that that in my judg-

course is being followed, and I believe it as the best
practice." 79 Cong Rec 13646, 74"' Cong, V4 Sess.
(1935).
Hastings was not satisfied. "May I inquire," he

ment makes very much more certan the constitutionalir
of the Iwo acts, but I say in doing it Senators are violating
the spirit of the Constitution, and what I am trying to find
out is whether or riot it has been done deliherately and For
the purpose of making more certain the constitutionality

inquired, "whether there is any objection to adding a

of these two bills," Id.

lbe

ing a separate bill?" "Yes; there is a valid objection,"

Wagner stiuck with Robinson's game plan, insisting,
"I know of no such delbberate design. I think a very clear

Robinson responded. "[Tihe Senate has no power to

and persuasive explanation was made as to why the two

originate a revenue neasure, and the body at the other

bills went to the separate comnilees."But Robinson.seeing a forensic opportunity where Wagner did not, had

new title to this hill, including

tax, instead of pass-

end of the Capitol probably would take the view that
we were originating a revenue measure if we put into

this bill a provision for

the tax

to which the Senator is

shifted ground.
"if the Senator from Delaware is in sympathy

referring." "May I inquire. why it was that the House
made these two separate bills?" Hastings persisted.
"There was no reason why the House could not add the
taxing feature to the bill, Why did they not make 0 in

with railroad penrsion legislation, if he believes that it
ought to be enacted, he certainly cannot object to any

one bill'?" "That Ls the business of the House," was
Wagner's curt if somewhat juvenile response. Id, at
13647.

he contended. "There is nothing wrong, there ts nothilg immoral, and there is nothing treacherous in separating the two subjects. They ought to be separated for
the reasons which I gave a few moments ago." Here he
rejoined Wagner. "One committee is familiar with the
subject matter of one phase of the legislation; another
committee is familiar with the subject matter of the
tax legisiation. Yet the Senator from Delaware is suspicious that there is something wrong with the policy
of passing two bills-ne as a tax bill. We seldom put
tax legislation in the bills we enact for the expenditure
or money. It was the consistent course which was pursued." Id. at 13647-48.
Here Senator Borah drove horne Robinson's defense

Robmnson's

tactic

was to return to the theme of

committee jurisdiction: "Mit Presideni," he explained,
"it may or may not have been due to my own suggestion. I felt then and still feel that the committee which
has jurisdiction of the legislatidn to provide for pensions, to work out the administrative features, is a
different committee from that which has the tax-raisLog authority, and I think the course that has been
pursued is the better course, Our committee formulaied the legislation-a committee which is familiar
with the subject matter of this bill. The taxing committee, the Ways and Means Committee, is composed
of men of eminence and of ability; nevertheless they

have not made the studies and do not possess the knowledge of this particular subject which is essential to
proper formuintion of the legislation. So I think the
course which the House has pursued is a good one. I am
perfectly willing, if the Senator thinks otherwise, to
have him get them to reverse their action if he can do
so." Idr

Wagner had by this point caught on to Robinson's
strategy, and now chimed ir "Mr. President, let me
say, in line with the suggestion of the Senator from
Arkansas, that like the Interstate Commerce Com-

course the Congress might decide to take which would

tend

to sustain the legislation aher it had been passed."

of separating the hills as a constitutional strategy. "I

understand the question which is raised here is to what
the effect constitutionally will be by reason of providing the two measures," he observed. "Suppose. .the
legislation is brought within the Constitution by reason
of that fact, is it not our duty to do that very thing?" At this
poini Wagner again caught up to his colleagues, half ad-

miting what hehad denied a moment earlier. "Tha is what
the Senator from Arkansas suggested." he agreed, "and I
tried to suggest that if we are friends of this measure and
anxious to provide a pension for theemployees, if the Senator is right, that is the very course which we ought to pitrsue." Id,.at 13648.
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There followed a colloquy among Senators Wagner.
Fletcher, and Barkley, in which it was made clear that the
pensions were to be paid out of the Treasury "out of any
funds not otherwise appropriated," and that while dhe tax
"has been figured out so as to conform to the actuarial
requirements" of the pension legislation, there was a "theoretical relationship between the two" bills. "but not a direct connection." Id. I3649-49. Fora similar discussion in
the ffouse.see id at 13670-71 (remarks of Mr. Hollister).

This prompted Senator Tydings to launch the second offensive against the proponents' constitutional strategy.

Throughout the discussion that followed, Tydings never
once let on that his suggestion, if adopted, might compromise the constitutional strategy that lay behind the separalion of the hills. Nevertheless, it clearly would have tended
to do so.
Tydings' suggestion was to earmark the tax and
pay its proceeds into a separate fund rather than mix-

ing them in with the general revenue. "I should much
rather have this fund segregated and the retirement
benefits paid out of such fund than have the Treasury

of the United States, withoot any limitation whatsoever, become the source from which these payments
are to be made," said Tydings. "1 believe it is extremely
bad policy to have the Federal Government made the
bank to pay pensions of this character.
Id. at
13649.
Wagner sought to fend him off by vouching for
the plan's actuarial integrity. "The calculations are
definitely made; they are predictable as to the amount

which will be required in order to secure a solvent fund
for the payment of these pensions; and a sufficient tax

is imposed to secure that fund. So whether it be segregated or put into the general fund of the Treasury is
really a very minor matter." Id.
If it was such a minor matter, Tydings replied, "I
take it the Senator would have no particular objection
to segregating these funds under the Railroad Retirement Board?' Wagner hedged, professing solicitude
for employees of (ie Treasury Department: "I should
want to consult the Treasury authorities. I think perhaps such segregation would impose upon the Treasury Department unnecessary bookkeeping and unnecessary work. It is a matter that I do not regard as

very important, so long as the calculations are definitely made, and that can be done." Tydings then expressed his wish that Wagner "at the very first opportunity. . consult the Treasury about the advisability of
having these moneys segregated into a separate fund," to
which Wagner responded, "Very well," "I am certain,"
Tydings persisted, "if the bill were now so worded that it
would attract support which otherwise might not be present.
I think some Senators feel that a matter that is extraneous

to the Government such as these funds, only being administered by the Government, ought not to be confused with
the general revenues of the Government." Id.
Here Wagner became conciliatory. "I may say that the
Senator raises a question really worth while," he conceded.
"Under this bill a commission is to be appointed to make
an investigation of all the matters that relate to this whole
subject. The commission may, among other things, study
the very question which the Senator has raised. Furthermore, the commission is to report to the Congress on January I next, which will be 3 months prior to the effective

date of this particular act: so that ample time will be afforded to study that very question." 1d
Not quite satisfied, Tydings replied: "Even so, Pf I may
so ask the Senator I request that he ascertain if the Treasury would look with favor upon it; and if the Treasury

should look with favor upon it and the author of the bill
should do so, I should like to see such a provision incorporated into the law. If subsequently after the examination

shall have been made, he should find that the money should
be covered into the generaIl fund for one reason or another,
that would be a diffrent thing. I do not like to start the bill
out in that form ifit can be avoided." At this point Wagner
asked to be let offthe hook. "At this late date," he replied
to Tydings, I hope the Senator will not press the suggestion, because the commission will be in a position to sidy
the question and to report to us before any tax is imposed
in accordance with the design of this bill." Id
Tydings did not press the suggestion, but Hastings
rejoined the colloquy to suggest that segregation of
the funds rather than payment of the pensions out of
the Treasury would be fatal to the schente's constitu-

tionality. Wagner attempted to cut Hastings short.
"There is no need of going into that I know the
Senator's point of view from the standpoint of the law
upon this subject; but there is no need of our pursuing
it any further. The courts will finally have to speak
upon that question." Id. at 13649-50.
But Hastings had to have the last words, and they
dripped with barely concealed sarcasm and disdain. "Mr.
President, I think this method of legislating is estab-

lishing an exceedingly bad precedent. I was delighted
to hear the Senator from New York [Mr. WAGNERJ
suggest that it was not designedly done. I had the dis-

tinct impression that the Social Security Act, as to the
constitutionality of which many of us had serious doubt,
was divided into separate titles because the fear was
existent that if the fund were segregated, as the Senator from Maryland [Mr. TYDINGSJ suggested he would
like to see done, there would be very grave danger of
the act being declared to be unconstitutional. . . when
I found in these two bills that the two proposals are
separated entirely, I reached the conclusion that some

smart person had probably thought he would be able to
circumvent the
certain and I am
Court may take
termine whether

Constitution in that way I was not
not now certain whether the Supreme
the two acts together in order to deboth or either may be constitutional.

"As an illustration, when we pass the second bill
providing for a tax upon railroads, there is no doubt
that nothing in that measure will show the purpose for

which the tax is levied. The Federal Government may
take it, may pay the pensions due the World War
veterans, may use it for relief, may use it to assist the
farmers, may use it as the Federal Government may
use any other part of the general fund which comes
into the Federal Treasury. That is undoubtedly true.
There is no earmark to the taxation. . - But the query

I have in mind is whether or not the Supreme Court may
look at the two acts and dete mine that the tax was levied
for a purpose.
"I do not raise the objection sere for any other
reason than to caution the Senate against this kind of
legislation which separates a tax bill from the purpose
of the tax itself ( think unless we can combine the
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two. and safely combine the iwo, we ought not to
enact it at all. I am not in favor of circumventing the
spirit of the Constitution in any way, We have developed new and important minds recently. They have
new ideas Ii seems to me that this is one idea which
they might be able to 'put over' I am glad, in view of
that thought, to hear the Senator from New York [MrWAGNER] say it was not done designedly, that it was
not for -any such purpose as that
"With that statement in the record I assume the
Supreme Court, when they come to consider one of
these acts, will feel justified in considering both of
them and reading the record in order to ascertain
whether or not we have done a lawful thing." Id. at
13652
In the House, Rep. Merritt echoed Hastings' objections. "Mr. Speaker, I do not propose to make any
general speech or argument against this bill, but I think
the Members of the House, if they do not appreciate
already what it is proposed to do, should have it called
to their attention. What we are doing today is to reenact a part of a bill which has already been declared
unconstitutional, The way it is proposed to avoid the
decision of the Supreme Court is to divide the bill into
two bills, and pass this bill, which gives the people who
are affected by it, a general claim on the United States
Treasury; and then this afternoon to pass an appropriation bill to cover the supposed expense which will
be incurred by this pension bill." Idf at 13673. See also
remarks of Rep. Hollister, id at 13671,
Alton R. Co. v Roilroad Retiremeni BoasI. 16 F. Supp.
955 (Dist. D.C., 1936).
a i at 956-57.
"The two taken together so dovetail into one another as
to create a complete system, substantially the same as that
created by the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934.... The
provisions of the two acts in question are so interrelated
and interdependent that each is a necessary parl of one
entire scheme. This is not only apparent from the terms of
the acts themselves, but is shown by their legislative history It was clearly the intention of Congress that the pension system created by the Retirement Act should be supported by the taxes levied upon the cariers and their employees." Id. at 956. "In the case at bar . the interlocking
and interdependent provisions of the two acts and their
legislative history do show an attempt to accomplish under certain of its powers an end which has been held to be
unconstitutional." Id at 957. "(Flrom what has been said
it necessarily follows that the two BetS are inseparable parts
of a whole, that Congress would not have enacted one without the other, that the taxes levied under the tax act are the
contributions required under the act of 1934. . . This being true, it is clear that under the views of the Supreme
Court in the A/ron case the taxing act transcends the powers of Congress. The pension system so created is substantially the same as that created by tbe act of 1934. and, apart
from its unconstitutionality as a whole, subject to the same
objections in certain particulars as those pointed out by
the Supreme Court in that case." Id. at 958. The court identified some of those particulars id. at 959.
The court rejected the claim that the two acts had to
be considered entirely separately because "the funds arising from the taxing act are not 'ear marked.' not kept as a
separate fund for the payment of pensions provided for in
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the RetirementAct,.. .[ThepurposeofCongress in passing [the Taxing Act) is clearly as shown . . . to provide
funds for pensions .. and not to provide for the expenses
of the govemment," That being so. "it would seem to be
immaterial whether the funds raised by the lax act are to
be segregated in the Treasury; that would be arnere marter
of bookkeeping, and would not affect the right of the taxpayer." 7'd at 957,
Several commentators had predicted this fate for the
1935 pension legislation. See, e.g., "Constitutional LawRailroad Retirement Act,"supra note 96, at 499, 501; "Constitutional Law Due Process-Incrslate CommercePower ofCongress to Provide forCompulsory Retirement

and Pension System for Carriers," supra note 96. at 5556; "The Railroad Retirement Acts,"supra note 96, at 5859; "Constitutional Law-Railroad Retirement Acts." suo note 96, at 173
This is reported in B. & O R. Co. v fagrader, 77 F
Supp. 156, 156-57 (D. Md., 1948).
As Rep. Lea, Chairman of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce explained in intro-

ducing the Railroad Retirement Act, "Representatives
of the 21 standard railway employees' organizations
representing substantially all railway employees on
class I railroads participated in the negotiations. Railway management representing 98 1/2 percent of the
total mileage of class I railways of the United States
participated in the negotiations. Class I railroads, as
the membership of the House is aware, embrace every
railroad whose annual income is over S,000,000.
"Members of the Federal Railroad Retirement
Board participated with representatives of the management and men in these conferences. Finally an
agreement was reached, the substance of which was
embodied in a bill brought before the Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee of the House. As a
result of the hearings and further consideration of that
measure by our committee a number of changes were

made which were approved by these two groups and
embodied in the bill now presented to the House." 81
Cong. Rec. 6080-81, 75", Cong. I Sess. (June 21,
1937), The Committee Reports similarly noted that
"The pending bill has received the endorsement of
both the labor organizations and the carriers, expressed
in hearings before the committee." H. Rep. No. 1071,
755 Cong. I Sess., at 2 (1937). See also S. Rep. No.
8 18, 755 Cong. I" Sess., at 2 (1937), which adopted
the House report as its own,

As Representative Doughton explained, "The
matter was given long and painstaking consideration,

and was thoroughly discussed with the employers, the
employees, and representatives of the Treasury De-

partnient. After long and deliberate consideration the
measure now has unanimous support. It is agreed to by

those who will pay the tax, it is acceptable to the
Treasury of the United States, and it has the unanimous support of the Committee on Ways and Means."
81 Cong Rec. 6302, 75* Cong. I" Sess (June 24. 1937).
"Representatives of the railroad men, represented by
Mr. George Harrison, president of the 21 brotherhoods,

came before our committee," noted Representative
Jenkins, "and indicated that they favored this legislation. The railroad executives, represented by Mr.

Fletcher, a capable and able representative, stated that
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they, too, were in favor of this legislation." Id. at 6303
Representative WoIverton reported that the District Court's
injunction "prompted the President to suggest to iepresen-

Latives

of railroad labor organizations and ralroad man-

agement that an effort be made to work out between them
a retirement plan which would be mutually satisfactory.
"In accordance with the suggestion of the President. a
committee was appointed by the Association ofAmerican
Railroads to confer with a committee appointed by the
Railway Labor Executives Association, representing de
employees. As a result of the conferences held by these

two representative groups the plan ofretirement was areed
upon and is embodied in amendments to the existing law.
The bill now before the House . represents that plan as
agreed upon by the carriers and their employees and approved by the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce after careful study and extensive hearings. The enactment of this bill in its present formn has been agreed

upon by all the interested parties." The bill "represents
absolute and complete unanimity of thought and desire

tive

Fish asked: "Is any of this money eanrarked for

this purpose when it goes into the Treasury?'

Representave Fred Vinson replied that it was not.
"This is a taxing bill that produces revenue collected
by tie Bureau of Internal Revenue. The revenues go
directly into the Federal Treasury, the general fund of
the Treasury." Fish responded. "1 simply want to ask
the gentleman if there is any reason why this money
should not be earmarked for this specific purpose."
Vinson replied 1hai "So far as this act is concerned,
mire act covers the money into the Treasury of the

United States. Congress has the power to appropriate
his money just as they appropriate all other money
that goes into the general Fund of the Treasury."

This was unresponsive, and Fish told Vinson so.
"But tire gentleman has not answered my question.

Why should it not be earmarked?"
The future Chief Justice answered: "Because, from
the beginning of our Government, until now, as I ani

informed, the policy of the Treasury has never been

between management and men. There is no feature of this
bill that presets any controversy or disagreement as between these two parties. Every provision has the support
of both without any reservation on the part of either. It

to earmark money coming into the general fund of the
Treasury . . " But "What about the Congress?" retorted Fish. "Cannot Congress do that?" Here Vinson

represents a unified effort to produce legislation that will

the Congress attenipted to collect taxes for a special
purpose, which may be characterized as earmarking-it was the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The processing taxes were held by the Supreme Court io be an
exaction which. under the act, did not go into the
general fund of the Treasury, but were used for a spe-

be satisfactory and mutually beneficial, and comes before
the House with the united support ofrailroad management

and all the standard brotherhoods "Id. at 6084-85. See also
id. a 6302 (remarks of Rep. Snell); id. at 6085-86 (remarks of Rep. Martin of Colorado); id. at 6087 (remarks
of Rep. Mapes): id, at 6087-88 (remarks ofRep. Cole of
Maryland); id. at 6089 (remarks of Rep. Mead); id. at 6092
(remarks of Rep. Raybum); id. at 6222 (remarks of Sen.
Wagner); id at 6224 (remarks ofSen. Wheeler); id at 6227
(remarks of Sen. Barkley).
Sponsors also explained the consttutIonal theory of
the plan. and the reasons why it was being enacted as two
bills rather than one. Representative Jenkins explained that

was finally forthcoming: '1 recall one instance when

cific purpose which the Supreme Court held to be beyond congressional power I am certain that my friend
from New York will recognize that a recurrence of
that sort of thing is not desirable. So I repeat that this
act is what it says it is the Carriers Taxing Act of
1937-a revenue bill in which the revenue will be collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. as other
taxes are collected, and they will become part and

"it was thought advisable to divide these bills and permit
the bill providing the amount the railroads should pay and
the manner ofpayment aid all incidents thereto to beconsidered by the Ways and Means Committee, which ofright
should consider j. And it was also thought advisable that
another bill should be introduced providing who should be

parcel of the general fund of the Treasury of the United
States." Id. at 6303-4.
If Mr. Fish thought that such a recurrence would
have been desirable, he did not say so. Debate concluded and the bill was passed without a record vote.
Id. at 6304. The bill passed the Serrate without debate

entitled to draw this pension and how much each class

and without a record vote. d, at 6345,

should draw, and also to provide what age men should be
required or be chrgible to draw the pension." Id at 6091.
In the Senate, Senator Davis explained that "The mea-

Remarks of Sen. Davis, id. at 6227. This echoed the
encomiums of the Committee Reports, which stared:

sure now before us is not predicated upon the power to
regulate commerce. but upon two separate and distinct

ployees upon tire great ability they have shown to
adjust matters of this sort through normal process of

powers vested by the Constitution in Congress, neither of
which was involved in the case holding the Retirement Act

collective bargaining. The agreement as to this mea-

of 1934 to be void.

"The measure now before us is predicated upon
ite right of Congress to appropriate money. Section
12 authorizes an appropriation for the purposes of the
bill out of the Treasury of the United States. This
appropriation is not payable out of any particular fund,
nor out of any money earmarked for that purpose."
Id, at 6227. See also id. at 6303 (remarks of Rep.
Jenkins),
In the Rouse there was a mild reprise of the colloquy Senators Wagner, Robinson, Hastings, and Tydings
had held in the Senate two years earlier. Representa-

"we wish to commend both the carriers arid the em-

sure constitutes a landmark in the history of industrial
relations in this country." Hl. Rep. No. 1071, 75 Cong. I'
Sess., at 2(1937); see also S. Rep. No. 818, 75" Cong. ist
Sess., at 2 (1937). Chairman Lea echoed these views on
tie floor of the HIouse: "This is the most Far-reaching agreemrent ever entered into between capital and labor in Iis or
any othercountry."81 Cong. Rc. 6081.7 5Cong. ISess.
(June 21.1937); see also remarks of Sen. Wagner id at
6222. For further praise of the agreeient, see remarks of
Rep. Wolverton, id at 6085; remarks of Rep. Martin of
Colorado id, at 6086; remarks of Rep, Mapes, id. at 6087;
remarks of Rep. Cole of Maryland. id, at 6088; remarks of
Rep. Mead, id. at 6089-90; remarks of Rep. Rayburn, 0.
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at 6092; remarks of Sen. Clark, id at 6222-23.
Ch. 3-17.44 Stat, 577 (1926).
Texas & Niw' Orleans Railroad Co. v Brotherhood of
Railway and Steamship Clerks. 281 U.S 548 (1930) (Justice McReyntolds did not participaLe). See also PHginian
Railway Co. v System Federation, No. 40. 300 U-S. 5 15
(1937) (unanimously upholding 1934 amendments to the
Act); Washington, Virginia & MarY/and Coach Co. v
NLRB. 301 U.S. 142 (1937) (unanimously upholding applicationof National Labor Relations Act to interstate bus
company); NLRB v Jones & Langhlin Steel Corp.. 301
US. I (1937) (upholding application of NLRA to steel
manufacturer), NLRS vt Fruehauf Trai/er Co., 301 U.S,
49 (1937)(upholding application of NLRA to trailer manufacturer); NSLRB vFiedman-lir Marks Clothing Co.,
301 U.S. 58 (1937) (upholding application of NLRA to
clorhtng manufacturer); A1ssociated Press u NLR8, 301
U.S. 103 (1937) (upholding application ofNLRA to wire
service company)
i Chairman Lea stated that -i is the belief of the cornnitltee that this act, and particularly i1s substantial features,
will be held constitutional should the Supreme Court be
called upon for its decision.' 81 Cong. Rec. 6081, 751
Cong. 11 Sess. (June 21,1937). See also it at 6302 (Rep.
Doughton professes faith in constitutionality of Carrier
Taxing Act and Railroad Retirement Act of 1937); id. at
6090-91 (Rep. Jenkins professes belief in constitutionality of Railroad Retirement Act of 1937): id, at 6093 (Rep.
Crosser proifscs faith in constitutionality of Railroad Retiremenr Act of 1937); id. at 6222 (Sen. Wagner expresses
confidence in the constitutionality of the 1935 Acts and of
the Railrond Relirement Act of 1937); id. at 6087 (Rep.
Cole of Maryland profcsses faith in the constitutionality
ofthe 1935 Acts); id. at 6092 (Rep. Rayburn does the same);
id at 6093 IRep. Crosser does thesane).
Id at 6081,
Id. at 6087. This was repeated several times on the
Chairman Lea reported that "The two great groups entering into agreement resulting in this legislation have agreed
not to contest it." ld at 6081. Rep. Wolvelton reported
that "it has been agreed by each of the parties that they
will upon its enactment support and defend its provisions."
I. at 6085. In the Senate Wagner reported that ¶the railroads agreed with the representatives of the workers that
if this measure were enacted they would not test its constitutionality, but accept it as law of the land." Id. at 6222.
See also remarks of Sen. Wheeler. id. 6224-25 (suggesting thata stockholder orsmall railroad suight nevertheless
bring a contest); remarks of Rep. Lea. id at 6081 (hinting
at the satte). For fear that floor amendments would unravel the deal between the railroads and the unions, the
Senate decisively rejected two amendments offered by
Wheeler See td. at 6224-27.
Rep. Mapes added -'It is further understood that
any suit or suits now pending in court to test the constitutionality of the existing railroad retirement law
will be withdrawn." Id. at 6087; see also remarks of Rep.
Wolverton, i. at 6085. Because the 1937 Act expressly
repealed the 1935 Act, the Court of Appeals directed the
District Court todismiss the A/ton suton the grounds that
it had become moot. Thus the 1935 Act was never challenged before the Supreme Court See B. & 0. R. Co. v.
Magruder, 77 F Supp, 156, 157 (D. Md.. 1948).
In Cahfornia v Latimer, 305 U1S. 255 (1938), the state

noor
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sought an injunction against collection of the tax from tts
own State Belt Railroad. The Court appears to have been
unsure exactly what the bill claimed. As Justice Brandeis
put it. 'The bill asserts, apparently, that ass matter ofstatu-

tory construction, the federal [retirement] system is not
applicable to the employees ofthc State Bet Railroad and
apparently that if construed as applicable to them, the legislation is unconstitutional." Id. at 257. The state's theory
was that application of the Carrier Taxing Act to the State
Belt Railroad would constitute taxation of a state instrumentality in violation of the principle ofintergovemmen-

tal

tax immunity. See Brief on Motion for Leave to File
Bill ofComplaint. 6, 20-21; Motion for Leave to File and
Brief of Complainant State of California in Support of

Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, 5-20, 28-29,
44-45; Supplemental Brief of Complainant State of California on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Bill ofConplaint,
10-18. In this last document, filed after doubt was cast on
the intergovernmental immunity claim by the Court's de-

cision in Helvering v Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938), the
state also contended that the 1937 acts were generally un-

conslitational. Id. at 18-21. The relief prayed for, however, was not that the federal railroad retirement act legislation be declared unconstitutional. It was instead more
modestly that it "be declared inapplicable to the State Belt

Railroad.' 305 U.S. at 258. Because the Court dismisscd
the bill as without equity, the opinion reached neither the
statutory nor the constitutional issue. The state again sought
exemption from the Carrier Taxing Act under the principle
of intergovernmental immunity, again without success, in

State of Ca/Uornia v Anglimn, 37 F Supp. 663 (iD. Cal.,
194 1 ). affd., Slate of California v Anglint. 129 F. 2d 455,
459 t9th Cir., 1942), cer. den., 317 U.S. 669 (942). In
two cases lower courts held parties exempt from the Car-

ner Taxing Act as a matter of statutory construction. See
Ocean S.S Co. oJSavannah v Allen, 36 F_ Supp, 851 (M.D.
Ga., 1941). affd., 123 F. 2d 469 (51b Cir, 1941): New England Freight Handling Co. Flassei, 33 F. Stupp. 610
(D Mass., 1940). See Robert Stern, "The Cornterce Clause
and The National Economy, 1933-1946," 59 11r L. Rev.
645, 693 (1946) (reporting that the "validity" of the revised
retirement program "has never been challenged").
116
See 45 U.S.C. 231 et seq.; 26 U.S.C. 3221-3232.
262 U.S. 447 (1923),
'5
Act of Nov. 23, 1921, c. 135, 42 Stat. 224.
262 U.S. at 487, For other Taft Court era cases rebuffing challenges to federal spending on the basis of Allon's
I

taxpayer standing doctrine, see, e.g.. Elliott v White, 23 F.

2d 997 (1928) (re jr-cling petition for injunction to prohibit
appropriations for salaries for federal chaplains); Wheless
vi Mellon, 10 F. 2d 893 (1926) irejecting suit to enjoin
enforcement of act providing for adjusted compensation

for war veterans)
IV Edward S, Corwin, Twilight of the Supreme Court
176 (1934).
See Samuel J. Konefsky, Chier Justice Stone and the
Supreme Court 102 n II (1945); Carl Swisher. Anerican Constitutional Development 838 (d ed. 1954); Dean
AlfangeThe Supreme Court and the National Will 17880, 205 (1937).
Benjamin F. Wrighi. The Growth of American Constitutional Law 184 (1942).
/Id. at 183.
See Alabanma Power Co i/ckes, 302 U.S. 464, 478-79
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(1938); Duke Power at Greennood County, 302 US. 485
(1938); Cahfornia Water Serv v Redding, 304 US. 252
(1938); Citv ofAllegan v Consumers'Power Co-, 71 F. 2d
477,480 (6th Cir., I 934), cert. denied 293 U.S. 586 (1934):
Central Illinois Pub. Sert Co- V Cite qf Bushnell, 109 F.
2d 26, 29 (7th Cir., 1940); Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood
Couniv, 91 F. 2d 665, 676 (4th Cir., 1937); Greenwood
County v Duke Power, 81 F.2d 986, 997 (4th Cir., 1936)
Aransas-Mo. Power Co. v. CityqofKennett, 78 F 2d 911,
914 (8th Cir., 1935); lowa S Utl. Co. v Town of Laurani,
11 F. Supp. 581. 585 (S.D. Iowa, 1935); Missouri Power
& Light Co. v, City of La Plat, 10 F. Supp. 653 (E.D.
Mo., 1935); Missouri Utilities Co a Cit' of California,
8 F Supp. 454, 464 (WAD Mo., 1934). See also Perkins
' Lukens Steel Co., 310 1,S. I13, 125 (1940) (relying
on Mellon in denying standing to challenge determination made under Public Contracts Act); Graff]' Town
of Se word, 9 Alaska 205 (1937) (denying plaintiff
standing to challenge Public Works Administration).
Mellon's broader justiciability doctrine was also
invoked by the lower courts in repulsing attacks on the
National Labor Relations Act, see Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. a Nlander, 14 F Supp. 201, 207 (S.D.
Cal., 1936); Ohio Custom Garment Co. v Lind, 13 F.
Supp. 533, 536 (S.D. Ohio, 1936); the second FrazierLernke Act, see In re Chilton. 16 F. Supp. 14,16 (D.
Col., 1936); In re Paul. 13 F. Supp. 645, 647 (S.D.
iowa, 1936); the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act
of 1935, see Barnidge a. United States, 101 F. 2d 295.
298 (8th Cir., 1939); the Securities and Exchange Conmission, see Deiroit Edison Co. v Securities & Exchange Commission, 119 F. 2d 730, 740 (6th Cir.,
1941); certain provisions of the amended Agricultural
Adjustment Act, see Wallace v Ganley, 95 F. 2d 364,
366 (D.C. Cir., 1938); and the Tennessee Valley Authority,
see Frahn v Tennessee V'allev Authority, 41 F, Supp. 83,
84, 86 (N.D. Ala, 1941); Tennessee Valley Authority v
Ashwander 78 F. 2d 578, 583 (5th Cir,, 1935); see also
Tennessee Electric Power Co. %.Tennessee Valley Authorit' 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939); Ashwander v Tennessee
ValleyA uhorit, 297 LS. 288 (1936).
48 Stat. 22. 23 (1933).
48 Stat, 257, 258 ()933).
49 Stat. 1, 4 (1935).
Q49 Stat. )363, 1364 (1936).
49 Stat. 1597. 1608 (1936).AsCarl Swisher put it,"Congress. . . continued to make appropriations of this kind,
largely innune from judicial scrutiny," Swisher, supra note
121 at 838-39. The Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts also rejected chalenges to the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation on standing grounds. See Kay v United States,
303 U.S. I (1938L See also Piunian a Home Cohners 'Loan
Corp., 308 U.S 21 (1939) (assuming constitutionality of
Home Owners Loan Corp.); Graves v New York ex rs.
O'Kee/e, 306 U.S. 466, 492 (1939) (assuming constitutionality of Home Owners'Loan Corp.); United States a.
Hill, 90 F.2d 573 (3d Cir., 1937), cer. den,, 302 U.S. 736
(1937), rch g den. 302 U.S. 779 (1937) (upholding constitutionality offlome Owner & Loan Corporation). The Federal Emergency Relief Act. 48 Stat. 55, 56 (1933). was
subjected to an unsuccesful "collateral attack" in Langer
a United States, 76 F, 2d 817, 824-25 (8th Cir., 1935),
where the court upheld the Act as a legitimate exercise of
Congress's power to appropriate money for the general

wel fare. In any event, the court held. citing Massachusetts
v Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), Frothingham's companion case, "no personal right of any appellant is infringed,"
and even if the Act constituted an invasion of state power

"still only an abstract question of political constitutional
law would be presented, with which the courts are nor concerned." Id. at 825.

Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31.
Id, section 8(1).
z AsthurM. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The
Coming of the New Deal 97 (1959).
In a 1932 campaign speech Roosevclt
argued that any
farm plan "must finance itself Agriculture has at no lime

sought and does not now seek any such access to the public treasury as was provided by the futile and costly attempts at price stabilization by the Federal Farm Board. It
seeks only equality of opportunity with tariff-proicted
industry." Raymond Moley, The First New Beat 250
Q966).
Act of May 12, 1933. ch. 25, Sections 9, 12, 48 Stat. 31
Undted States a Btler. 297 U.S. 1, 57-61 (1936). The
dissent did not take issue with the majority on the question
of standing. See 297 U,.S. at 78 (Stone, 1., dissenting). See
alsoAlfange, sipra note 121,at 184, 187-88.
297 U.S. 1 (1936).
Id. at 68. Kelly and Harbison reported "a tumor given
wide credence in Washington" that "asserted that Chief
Justice Hughes had at first believed the statute constitu-

tional, but that he had ultimately voted with the majority
only because he thought another 5-lo-4 decision would
seriously damage the Court's prestige." Alfred H. Kelly,

et al., The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development 750 (4thed. 1970). Harold kekes' diary reveals
that Homer Cunmmnings repeated this gossip at a Cabinel
meeting n early 1936, lckes, supra note 46, at 535-36.
- Alfange, supra note 121, at 180-81. See F G[ ogi
Sons Inc '. Rothensies, II F Supp. 225, 226 (E.D. Pa..
1935).
A49 Stat. 1148 (1936).
See Swisher, supoa note 121, at 902: Frank B. Freidel,
Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendevous Wilth Destiny 234
(1990); Stern, supra note 115, at 689-90; Richard
Kirkendall, "The New Deal and Agriculture," in Braeman,
Bremner & Brody, eds., The New Deal: The National
Level 94 (1975).
80 Cong. Rec. 1778, 74* Cong. 2nd Sess. (February
&
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11.1936).

See Note, "Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act," 24 Go. L. J. 962, 965-67 (1936).
Stem. supra note 115. at 689-90. Arthur Schlesinger
reports that Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace

"was aware in 1935 that AAA, in its original form, was
beginning to play out. Acreage reduction was breaking
down in certain areas, partly because too many of the
farmers (as in wheat) were staying outside the system,
partly because increases in productivity nullified the
effect of reducing acreage. . .Wallace, as he told Henry
Morgenthau on a walk to work on a fall morning in
1935, would be glad enough to have the processing tax

declared unconstitutional, so that AAA would thereafter get its money from the general tax funds. It was
clear to him, and even clearer to Howard R. Tolley,
head of the Program Planning Division, that AAA
would have to evolve in new directions." Schlesinger,
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.wpra note 132, at 82.
52 Stat. 31 (1938).
See Cushman, supra note 70, at 191-92, 196-97.
297 U.S. at 63-64.
See ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921) (amended by the
Grain Futures Act, ch, 369, 42 Stat 998 (1922)) (coditied as amended at 7 U.S.C. section 1-26 (1992)).
259 U.S. 44 (1922).
Id. at 66-68.
003d. at 69-69,
3 ld at 69.
m See Act of Aug. 15. 1921, ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159
(1921) (current version at 7 U.S.C. section 181-229
1

See Staftord vi Wallace. 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
See ch. 369. 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (amended by the
Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545. 49 Stat, 1491
(1936)) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. section 1-26
(1992)).
262 U.S. 1 (1923).
82 Cong. Rec. 341, 75"' Cong. 2nd Sess, (1937).
Id. at 340-41. Pope agreed with Senator McKellar
that Congress ought to "make perfectly clear to the Court.
.what Congress had in mind by staling the purpose of the
bill on its face," predicting that every member would see
the importance of the bill's legislative findings concerning the effect of unregulated agricultural marketing on interstale corrunerce "when the Court comes to pass upon
the constitutionality of the pending measure." Id. at 341.
1Id at 341.
307 U.S. 38 (1939).
Brief for Ibt United States at 110 (citations omitted).
1 307 U.S. at 47.
Robert Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 238 (1941), See also Swisher, supra note
121, at 957; Comment, "Interstate Commerce- -Federal Regulation of Tobacco Marketling Held Constitutional," 52 Har L, Rev 1364 (1939).
273 U.S. 12 (1927),
Among them were NRA head General Huigh Johnson,
NRA counset Donald Richberg. and Commissioner of
Statistics ILador Lubin, Bruce A. Murphy, The
BrandelslFrankfurter Connection 167 (1982).
Also in attendance were presidential aide Tommy
Corcoran, Senator Robert Wagner, and Charles
Wyzanski, the talented young Labor Department Solicitor who would ultimately defend the Social Security
Act before the Coun Id, at 168,
See Murphy, supra note 164, at 165-69; see also
Elizabeth Brandeis Raushenbush to LDB, Sept. 30,
1933; EBR so LDB, Sept. 24, 1933; Lincoln Filene to
.0B. Dec. 26, 1933; W. L. Stoddard to 1.08, Dec. 27,
1933; W. L. Stoddard to Lincoln Filene, Dec. 27. 1933;
Tom Corcoran to Paul Raushenbush, Jan. 26. 1934;
Paul Raushenbush to Tom Corcoran, Jan. 26. 1934
(Brandeis Papers, University of Louisville, microform).

III

Murphy, supro note t64, at 169; EBR to LDB, Feb. 5,
1934; Beulah Amidon to EBR, Feb. 6, 1934:A.J. Altmeycr
to EBR, Feb. 9, 1934: EBR to LDS, Feb. 10, 1934; EBR to
LDB, Feb. 12,1934; FBR to LDB, Feb. 15, 1934 (Brandeis
ppers, University of Louisville, microform).
Murphy, supra note 164, at 169-75; FDR to FF, June
11, 1934, in Roosevelt and Frankfurter: Their Correspondence, 1928-1945 122-23 (Max Freedman. annot.
1968); Ton Corcoran and Ben Cohen to FF, June 18,1934.
id. at 123-26. See also Schlesinger, supra note 132, at 30103, 305-06; Joseph P Lash, Dealers and Dreamers 24445 (1988); William E, Leuchtenburg, Franklin D.
Roosevelt and the New Deal 130 (1963)
Murphy, supra pole 164, at 176-77,
Steward Machine Co. vt Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
Id at 591-92.
301 U.S. at 598 (McReynolds. J., dissenting); 301
U.S. at 616 (Butler, J.. dissenting).
1 Id al 609 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
See George Sutherland to Richard R. Lyman. Ian,
21- 1938, George Sutherland to Mr. Preston (initials
unknown), Jan. 18, 1938; George Sutherland to Nicholas Murray Butler, Jan, 12, 1938, Box 6, Sutherland
MSS, LC_
Alsop & Catledge, supra note i, at 206; Pusey,
supra note 1, at 760.
"I agree that the payroll tax levied is an excise
within the power of Congress; that the devotion of
not more than 90% of it to the credit of employers in
states which require the payment of a similar tax under
so-called unemployment-tax laws is not an unconstitutional use of the proceeds of the federal tax; that the
provision making the adoption by the state of ar unemptoyment law of a specified character a condition precedent to the credit of the tax does not render the law invalid." 301 U.S. at 609-10 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
17Id at613-14.
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